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Abstract 
 
It is just over fifty years since the United Nations adopted the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs (1961), explicitly proscribing the manufacturing of, trade in, and use of narcotics for 
anything but scientific and medicinal purposes. Today, the 1961 agreement, alongside the 
similarly-focused 1971 and 1988 UN Conventions remain the bases of the international drug 
control regime despite the continuously high rates of drug use, trade, and production that remain 
worldwide. Taking due cognizance of these inconsistencies, the present study seeks to examine 
how the system of international drug control developed over the past century and, through this, 
why it is that prohibition continues to be the international community’s primary response to the 
‘drug issue’.  
Methodologically, the study applies two distinct analytical frameworks. The first framework 
applied—Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore’s constructivist norm life-cycle model— 
systematically traces the evolution of the norm of prohibition over time and helps identify the 
main causal mechanisms at work in each stage of the norm’s life. While the model is successful 
in regards to these aforementioned aspects, however, the research also shows the model does not 
adequately examine the role of power in international norm dynamics.  The model, more 
specifically, does not discuss how existing power relations can help sustain a norm’s livelihood 
long past its (perceived) effectiveness. Additionally, it is also shown through this application that 
prohibition did not develop in the exact manner the model suggests it would, but became 
institutionalised only in its final, internalisation phase instead of its emergent phase. 
In this manner, the second theoretical framework—that of Robert Cox’s critical theory—is 
consequently introduced to address the life cycle’s limitations. By applying Cox’s ideas on 
hegemony—herein understood as a fit between material power, ideas, and institutions—the study 
demonstrates how the hegemony of (primarily) the United States (US) has always and continues 
to play a leading role in supporting the norm of international drug prohibition today. The study 
concludes with some final notes about further research and the possibilities for change. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Overview 
The cultivation, trading, and consumption of mind-altering substances are not recent phenomena 
in human history. Indeed, people have long traded and used natural and psychoactive substances 
for medicinal, cultural, spiritual, and recreational purposes.1 According to some historical 
reports, early evidence of opioid consumption dates back nearly 2500 years ago to ancient Greek 
civilization, while records of cannabis use in China, Greece, and the Middle East are traceable to 
at least 2000 B.C.E. Likewise, in the Andean regions of South America, the practice of chewing 
coca (the main ingredient in cocaine manufacturing) is nearly 4000 years old.2 
 
Alongside this enduring account of drug use, however, is another more antithetical history as 
measured attempts to prohibit the production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs have a long 
narrative of their own. According to some reports, political attempts to control drug use and drug 
production are evident as far back as ancient Egypt and even existed amongst Aztec and Incan 
civilisations as well. Modern, domestic laws of a similar nature, however, are traceable to the 
early nineteenth century.3 Bearing all this in mind, a relatively current trend in this long-lasting 
history—and one that is of central importance to this study—is the establishment of 
internationally-coordinated treaties and laws that, since the early twentieth century, have sought 
                                               
 
1
 Marc-Antoine Crocq. “Historical and Cultural Aspects of Man’s Relationship with Addictive Drugs,” Dialogues in 
Clinical Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3202501/ (Accessed July 
15
th
 2014); “A Brief History of the Drug War,” Drug Policy Alliance, Available online: 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (Accessed July 10th 2014). 
2
 Michael J. Brownstein. “A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid Receptors,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 90, No. 12 (1993), 5391; “Cannabis, Coca & 
Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants,” Drug Enforcement Administration Museum & Visitor Centre. 
http://www.deamuseum.org/ccp/opium/index.html (Accessed September 10th 2014). 
3
 R.G. Penn. “The State Control of Medicines: The First 3000 Years,” British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, Vol. 8, 
No. 4 (1979); 293-294; Marlene Dobkin de Rios and David E. Smith. “Drug Use and Abuse in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective,” Human Organization, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1977), 17. 
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to restrict the manufacturing, trade, and use of psychoactive substances for anything but 
scientific and medicinal purposes. 
  
The first of these agreements emerged at the Shanghai Conference in 1909 and later at the 
Opium Convention at The Hague in 1912.4 For most of their signatories, recreational drug use 
was considered to be both morally and tangibly harmful to society and thus a practice to be 
contained, if not eradicated completely.5 While the 1912 Convention’s focus was specifically on 
restricting the supply and trade of opium (which at the time, had already played a role in state-to-
state interactions), the member states also included morphine and cocaine under the 
Convention’s parameters as well. Being the first agreement of its kind, the stipulations decided 
upon were mostly vague and not yet systematised; in effect, the only important decision passed 
was for member states to stop exporting opium, cocaine, and morphine to countries that had 
outlawed their use.6 These conditions were not fully enforced, or put into practice, until the end 
of World War I as part of the peace talks in Versailles in 1919. 
 
The resolution at The Hague was but the first in a long line of prohibitive international 
agreements. Not long after, the stipulations were subsumed under the auspices of the League of 
Nations and then further expanded upon with the Geneva Opium Conventions of 1924-1925. 
These later agreements produced substantially more concrete resolutions than their precursor 
had. The states involved not only agreed to restrict the manufacturing, trade, and use of opium, 
cocaine, morphine, and cannabis in their countries, they also agreed to report their estimated 
                                               
 
4
 London School of Economics: Ideas Special Reports, Governing the Global Drug Wars, 2012, 8-9. Available online: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/SR-014-FULL-Lo-Res.pdf (Accessed August 25th 
2014). The Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 was actually the predecessor to The Hague conference in 1912, 
yet little was agreed upon at that time. The member states agreed to meet three years later.     
5
 The Opium Convention at The Hague was signed by 12 states in total: the United States, France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Russia, Siam, Persia, and China. Not all of the countries 
that signed were in complete agreement that opium and other substances should be eradicated as, for some of 
them, these substances were an important source of revenue. Germany, for instance, had a very large 
pharmaceutical industry at the time.  On the other hand, some countries like the United States and China were 
adamant about decreasing the trade of these substances almost completely. See Carstairs for further information.  
6
 Catherine Carstairs. “The Stages of the International Drug Control System,” Drug and Alcohol Review, No. 24, 
(2005), 58, Available online: Academic Search Premier (accessed September 10
th
 2014).  
10 
 
 
levels of drug consumption and production to the newly created Permanent Central Opium Board 
(PCOB).7 The PCOB, or the predecessor to today’s International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), was a quasi-judicial organ of the League of Nations whose main task was to monitor the 
manufacturing and trade of narcotic substances throughout the world.8 
 
By the mid-twentieth century, the United Nations (UN) had emerged in the place of the failed 
League of Nations. Following in its predecessor’s footsteps, the UN did not drastically change 
any of the existing treaties on narcotics at the time, but merely co-opted them under its own 
governance. While various protocols were implemented in the period between 1945 and 1960, 
they had little traction and only minimally (if at all) added to the Conventions already in place.9 
By 1961, the UN amalgamated all pre-existing agreements under the newly adopted Single 
Convention on Narcotics. Not only did this treaty replace the PCOB and the Drug Supervisory 
Board (DSB) with the International Narcotics Board (who took on the quasi-judicial role of 
monitoring treaty adherence), it truly consolidated the international agreements into one, more 
comprehensive charter. Furthermore, the 1961 Convention, for the first time, explicitly 
prohibited the trade and production of these substances for anything but scientific and medicinal 
use. In effect, by becoming party to its stipulations, the member countries were binding 
themselves to the resolutions adopted—most of which were highly restrictive in nature and 
focused on fixing the problem of supply, but not demand. 
 
Throughout the 1960s, to continue further, newer synthetic drugs were becoming increasingly 
popular amongst consumers. Amphetamines, psychedelics, and barbiturates, or what are known 
as psychotropic substances, began to saturate the market and were being used for both medicinal 
and recreational purposes. By the 1970s, the United Nations responded by creating yet another 
treaty restricting the manufacturing and trade of these newer mind-altering drugs. In 1971, the 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances amended existing agreements by placing these 
newer drugs onto the schedule of restricted substances. Further enforcement mechanisms were 
                                               
 
7
 London School of Economics: Ideas Special Reports, Governing the Global Drug Wars, 8-9. 
8
 Carstairs, “The Stages of the International Drug Control System,” 58. 
11 
 
 
put into place years later under the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Unlike previous agreements, which focused 
mostly on the classification and scheduling of substances, the 1988 treaty concentrated 
specifically on preventing cross-border trafficking.  
 
As of today, the United Nations’ Conventions are still very much in effect: 184 countries are still 
party to the Single Convention on Narcotics, 183 states are party to the amended Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, and 189 countries are party to the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.10 All forms of illicit drugs—
ranging from cannabis to methamphetamines—remain scheduled into four different classes 
according to their scientific properties and their level of proscription (with Schedule I and IV 
being the most restrictive). The United Nations, by means of their subsidiary organizations, the 
INCB and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), continue to monitor and 
evaluate the extent to which member parties abide by the regulations as stipulated in the 
Conventions. Despite the fact that the legal status and subsequent penalties for producing, 
trafficking, and using these substances ultimately remain under the jurisdiction of federal or 
provincial/state law, it is important to note that very few states—with the recent exceptions of 
Colorado, Washington, and the country of Uruguay—have strayed far from the prohibitive 
nature of UN agreements. 
 
Inalienable as they may seem at first glance, what is disconcerting about these conventions is the 
lack of evidence to support the idea that prohibition is the most expedient way to solve the ‘drug 
issue’ or that restrictive type policies are necessarily the best way to conceptualize drug 
consumption more generally. Current figures from the UNODC, for instance, estimate that 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
9
 Ibid, 8. 
10
 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Available online: 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf (Accessed April 20th 2014); United Nations, Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances¸1971. Available online: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf (Accessed 
April 20
th
 2014); United Nations, United Nations Conventions against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988. Available online: 
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between 162 million-324 million people worldwide consumed some form of illicit drug in the 
past year with cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and amphetamines being the most popular substances 
amongst consumers. Drug-related illnesses, on a similar note, remain a serious public health 
issue in most countries of the world as well. According to data collected by the UNODC and the 
World Health Organization (WHO), of the 12.7 million people who inject drugs intravenously, 
13% of them live with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).11 In addition, the World Drug 
Report 2014 also estimates that 1 in 6 ‘problem’ drug-users worldwide (with significant regional 
variations) sought treatment for their drug use over the past year.12  
 
On the supply side, in contrast, the illicit drug industry continues to generate not just incredible 
revenues, but rampant crime as well. Mexico’s ongoing drug war—which has seen thousands of 
people die as the result of incessant fighting between drug cartels, government officials, and 
civilian groups—is but one example of the severity of the problem.13 With global revenues from 
illicit trafficking comprising 0.6% of the world’s GDP or somewhere in the range of 270 billion-
430 billion U.S. dollars, it is not difficult to figure out why the narcotics industry has become one 
of the largest criminal enterprises in existence.14 
 
Perhaps even more troubling is that these issues are not recent or newly occurring either; they are 
simply the unsolved problems of the past manifesting themselves in different ways. To put it 
differently, HIV transmission between intravenous drug users was a huge issue when the 
infection became widespread thirty years ago, yet the problem still remains. Before Mexico’s 
drug war, in a similar vein, numerous cocaine cartels operated in Colombia under Pablo Escobar 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&lang=en (Accessed 
April 20th 2014).  
11
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2014, ix. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_Report_2014_web.pdf (Accessed April 20th 2014). 
12
 Ibid., 19. 
13
 Randal C. Archibald, “Civilians Falling Victim to Mexico’s Drug War,” The New York Times, October 29
th
 2010, 
Available online: http://www.nytimes.com (Accessed August 25
th
 2014).   
14
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting From Drug Trafficking and 
Other Transnational Organized Crime, 2011, 29. Available online: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf (Accessed April 20th 2014).  
13 
 
 
and generated huge profits from it. Likewise, throughout the 1980s, countless unsuccessful anti-
drug campaigns emerged, yet levels of consumption remain high today. If complete eradication 
of drug use and production is the goal of the international community, clearly it is not even close 
to fruition. Yet, despite the mounting evidence in contradiction of prohibition’s futility, most (but 
albeit not all) of the international community continues to support the UN’s prohibitionist 
policies towards drugs rather than leaning towards alternative, harm-reduction strategies. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement, Research Aims & Rationale 
 
Considering that the evidence of prohibition’s futility is well-documented, for some reason the 
international community continues to endorse a zero-tolerance policy towards drugs with only a 
few people questioning why. Added to the fact that this ineffectuality is not a recent occurrence, 
but rather a chronic one, it becomes even more puzzling why prohibition—as opposed to harm 
reduction or alternative development strategies15—was and continues to be the official mandate 
endorsed by the United Nations and most of the international community. Bearing all of this in 
mind then, this paper seeks to add to the existing literature on international drug control in two, 
distinct ways: first, by demonstrating that drug prohibition is an international norm and, as such, 
is traceable over time; and second, by demonstrating that as the norm is ineffectual in achieving 
its goals, it continues to endure in spite of its failures largely because of underlying power 
relations existent in the international system.  
 
By examining international drug control in this manner, it is not only possible to understand why 
the UN made prohibition its official policy in the first place, but also how the existing power 
                                               
 
15
 Although, it will be further discussed in later chapters, harm reduction refers to reducing the negative risks 
associated with drug use and abuse while alternative strategies focus more upon providing those farmers 
responsible for drug production with alternative forms of development and individual livelihood. For more 
information on both of these strategies, see: “Harm Reduction,” Transnational Institute, Available online:  
http://www.tni.org/category/issues-workarea/drugs-democracy/harm-reduction (Accessed June 28th 2014); 
“Alternative Development,” Transnational Institute, Available online: http://www.tni.org/category/issues-
workarea/drugs-democracy/alternative-development (Accessed June 28th 2014).   
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relations between states can help sustain a norm’s longevity even in light of its impracticality. 
Similarly, examining why this norm continues to exist may potentially shed light on the barriers 
preventing significant change to the existing international drug treaties today. On a separate note, 
to conclude, by labelling global drug prohibition a norm, this paper is also able to add to the 
existing literature on norms research within international relations more generally. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The study will be of an exploratory and more descriptive nature. In order to provide a thorough 
analysis on the norm of international drug prohibition, this research will make use of both 
primary and secondary sources as evidence. Historical documents—mostly in the form of the 
United Nations Conventions on narcotics, statistical findings from the UNODC and the WHO, 
and documents prepared by the INCB—will comprise of the primary sources used. The 
secondary sources consulted will consist of academic, peer-reviewed books and journals as well 
as credible newspaper articles. 
 
While it hopes to add to international norms literature more generally, the following research 
will be a single-case study focusing on the norm of international drug prohibition specifically. 
The analytical frameworks discussed at length below, in this manner, provide the theoretical 
basis from which the norm of prohibition itself will be assessed. Although the results of a single-
case study may not necessarily be generalizable to a wide set of cases, the norm of drug 
prohibition itself remains an important subject of focus insofar as it remains widely-endorsed by 
the international community, but largely ineffectual in practice.  
 
1.4  Theoretical/Analytical Framework 
 
To achieve the research aims stated above, this study will use both a constructivist and a critical 
theory framework as the background for analyses, yet in different ways and for different reasons. 
Before outlining specifically how these theories will be put to use, it is necessary to first briefly 
consider why these approaches, as opposed to other alternative theories of international relations 
15 
 
 
(IR), are most applicable. Moving forward in such a manner not only helps place this study 
within the wider discourse of IR in general, but also more fully demonstrates the reasoning 
behind and motivations for choosing these specific theories. 
As most students of IR know, the major approaches in the discipline—neorealism and 
neoliberalism—focus primarily on the structure of the international system and the material 
characteristics of states to explain and predict events in global politics. The strength of the 
military, the robustness of the economy, the size of the population, and the geopolitical location 
of the state are all important factors that scholars from these schools consider when explaining 
phenomena in IR.16 For constructivists though, material factors may be significant, but so are 
ideas. A proper understanding of inter-state relations, in this constructivist view, necessitates an 
examination of ideational influences as well as material ones. From the perspective of a critical 
theorist, contrarily, material forces do matter, but not just in the abstract; instead, how material 
forces are actually used within the inter-state system intimately affects the lives of people around 
the world. Considering, in this manner, that the norm of international drug prohibition 
categorically stems from the idea that drugs are harmful to society and that the resulting treaties, 
agencies, and institutions created around this idea impact the lives of real people, it is essential to 
use those theories that recognize both the importance of ideas and materialism in their 
explanations of the social world. 
 
On a separate but related matter, most neorealists and neoliberals view the world in cyclical, 
ahistorical terms; simply put, they do not consider context, history, or change to be of any great 
importance in explaining phenomena in IR. Despite their differences in reasoning, in contrast, 
both critical and constructivist theorists see history, change, and context as central to shaping the 
social world. More specifically, while constructivists place greater emphasis on examining and 
explaining the processes of ideational and identity change often over time, critical theorists 
actually seek to induce emancipatory change (in both theory and practice). Within the specific 
                                               
 
16
 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and 
Duncan Snidel, 301 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Richard Shapcott, “Critical Theory,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidel, 327-330 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
16 
 
 
instance of international drug control, it would be almost impossible to fully understand 
prohibition’s emergence and preservation without considering the necessary historical conditions 
at work in its creation. Thus, while neorealists and neoliberals could potentially provide valuable 
insights into international drug control, they are ultimately limited by their structural, ahistorical, 
and parsimonious assumptions. Constructivist and critical theory explanations are often more 
sensitive to the underlying processes that shape world order and in general, are better-suited to 
explain change. 
 
Undoubtedly, constructivist and critical theories are neither identical to one another nor without 
their own intra-paradigmatic variations. Indeed, there is considerable difference between 
constructivism and critical theory and also significant variances within these theories as well. 
Thus, while both approaches concern themselves with the power of ideas, critical theorists focus 
more predominantly on understanding the underlying power relations within society and the 
conditions necessary for human emancipation (or freedom).17 In addition, while both 
constructivists and critical theorists discuss the role of change in international relations, 
constructivist interpretations are often less normative in nature in comparison to those of critical 
theorists. On the other hand, critical theorists not only seek to understand how the world came to 
be, but also how it can change for the benefit of all.18 
      
With regards to the application of these theories, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s 
‘norm-life cycle’19 will be the major constructivist framework employed in this study. Their 
model, being one of the first of its kind, systematises the process by which norms come to 
emerge and become entrenched within the international system. The authors posit, more 
specifically, three distinct stages of norm evolution: norm emergence (stage 1); ‘norm cascade’ 
(stage 2); and internalization (stage 3). Within each of these stages, Sikkink and Finnemore 
discuss various social processes at work in the norm’s development. Although the authors do not 
                                               
 
17
 Shapcott, “Critical Theory,” 327-329. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), 896. 
17 
 
 
fully consider the role of power relations in the emergence and preservation of ineffectual norms 
(a major criticism of the model), the norm life-cycle itself does provide a more methodical way 
of understanding norm evolution. 
 
The critical theory of Robert Cox—also labelled ‘Coxian critical theory’ (CCT)—forms the other 
major theoretical approach in this study. Undoubtedly, Coxian critical theory is multi-faceted and 
remarkably complex. When applying Cox’s ideas to the norm of global drug prohibition, some of 
his insights relate better than others and thus, only some of his ideas will be of use to this study. 
Cox’s concept of hegemony (which he derives both from Gramsci and Machiavelli) is of 
considerable relevance for instance. Instead of conceptualising hegemony as one state’s 
preponderance of power over others,20 Cox sees hegemony as a mix between coercion and 
consent or as a fit between material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. With regards to this study 
in particular, it may appear arbitrary at first glance to use the notion of hegemony to explain 
global drug prohibition. Yet, considering that international prohibition is still in effect despite its 
failures, it is reasonable to question why the international community still commits itself to such 
an endeavour and who benefits from this strategy. What is more definitive than pure speculation, 
however, is the continued role of the US and its allies in establishing, funding, and continuing to 
promote prohibition as the primary means of dealing with the drug issue.21 By using Cox’s 
insights as one of the theoretical frameworks in this study, it is possible to gain a better 
understanding of the underlying power relations at work in sustaining prohibition. 
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1.5 Limitations and Delimitations 
 
While this study seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis on international drug prohibition, 
there are some limitations to its scope. First, the research will focus only on the norm of drug 
prohibition on an international level and will thereby not discuss the experiences of specific 
countries or individual domestic political factors that contributed to prohibition’s adoption within 
certain states. In other words, this is not a study that concerns itself with explaining each and 
every country’s decision to adopt prohibition, but rather a study of the norm of prohibition in an 
international context more generally. With that in mind however, it must also be noted that 
international norms only exist in large part because of domestic levels so this is important to 
consider as well. In addition, seeing as the study will focus solely on one kind of international 
norm, the findings will only be applicable to this case and not necessarily generalizable. 
However, an in-depth analysis of how this specific norm has become universalized might give 
greater insight into other possible areas of research regarding international norms. To conclude, 
the analysis will also focus only on those psychoactive substances restricted by the UN 
conventions for recreational and non-medicinal use. So, while it will discuss substances like 
cannabis, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates, and opiates, the study will not examine other 
psychoactive substances like alcohol, tobacco, or caffeine. 
 
1.6 Conceptualisation 
 
Before concluding, it is necessary to delineate exactly what is meant by the terms and treaties to 
be discussed throughout subsequent chapters. Thus, the section that follows details what is meant 
explicitly by each term in the context of this study and relevant UN Conventions. 
   
1.6.1 Drugs: Narcotics and Psychotropics 
 
Considering that ‘drugs’ is a relatively ambiguous, all-encompassing word, it is necessary to 
better delineate what is meant by the term in the context of this research specifically. While any 
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chemical substance is considered a drug when it produces biological effects (either mental or 
physical) in a user after its consumption, the substances of major focus here are not those used to 
alleviate or cure chronic or temporary illnesses (albeit they may have some medicinal purposes), 
but rather those used by people primarily for recreational use. As such, the substances here 
referred to—cannabis, opiates, amphetamines, cocaine, and their associated derivatives—are 
those illicit drugs used recreationally by individuals. They are also the substances most 
stringently controlled and monitored by the UNODC, the WHO, the INCB, and other similarly-
purposed national and international bodies.22 
 
In terms of their composition, the substances listed above each contain different chemical 
properties and consequently induce different reactions in consumers (like euphoria, relaxation, 
attentiveness, etc.).23 What makes these drugs illicit in almost every country, as will be discussed 
in greater detail below, are the harmful health risks associated with their over-consumption and 
abuse.24 Common side effects and potential harms related to most (but not all) of these 
substances, in this manner, include dependency, addiction, cognitive impairment, mood 
disturbances, and potential HIV and other STI transmission for intravenous drug users.25 
  
Due to the illicit nature of the substances as well, the consumption, trade, and manufacturing of 
narcotics is largely associated with crime, criminal activity, and criminal enterprise. Not only is 
this ‘deviance’ stigma associated with those trafficking or producing narcotics, but also to those 
caught consuming or in possession of these substances as well. In most countries, drug users, 
suppliers, traffickers, and producers are criminally charged if caught and can be incarcerated for 
their actions. Appendix A and B not only show where most drug-producing countries are located, 
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but also the most common trade routes for illicit drug trafficking and the countries with the 
highest rates of drug consumption.          
 
1.6.2 Prohibition 
 
Although the concept will be discussed at greater length in the following sections, the term 
‘prohibition’ in the context of this research refers specifically to the complete eradication of all 
drug manufacturing, trade, and use that is not explicitly for medicinal or scientific purposes. 
Some of the substances listed above, like heroine, morphine, codeine (an opiate), and cannabis, 
have medicinal usages that are accepted widely by the international community. It is only in the 
context of recreational use, in this matter, that the term prohibition refers to herein. 
 
1.6.3 The UN Conventions on Illicit Substances 
 
As mentioned above, there are three treaties that form the basis of the current international drug 
control system—all of which concentrate most predominantly on handling the supply side of the 
drug issue, without much (or basically any) focus on the demand side. The 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotics is the most fundamental of all three insofar as it was the first of its kind 
in terms of comprehensiveness and widespread acceptance. The agreement’s primary focus, in 
this manner, was on prohibiting cocaine, cannabis/cannabinoids, and opium-derived substances. 
According to Article 4, signatories agree to oblige by the stipulations laid out in the conventions 
in the following ways: 
 a) To give effect to and carry out the provisions of the Convention within their own 
territories; 
 b) To co-operate with other States in the execution of the provisions of this 
Convention; and 
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 c) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, and 
possession of drugs.26  
 
By signing onto the Convention, in other words, member states agreed to implement legislation 
in their respective countries in a manner consistent with the UN’s mandate. All of the illicit 
substances scheduled, in other words, were prohibited from any form of recreational use. 
Additionally, signatories also agreed that drug stocks in each state—namely, those drugs needed 
solely for scientific and medicinal purposes—were to be estimated annually (by need) by the 
INCB and then reported on and monitored to ensure compliance.27 Ultimately, with 184 
countries party to the Convention at present, the agreement remains the basic template for most 
drug-related international treaties and the model from which most countries continue to base 
their domestic drug legislation on. 
  
The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances amended the original UN treaty a decade later. 
Although it did not drastically alter the original agreement, the 1971 treaty did maintain its 
prohibitive nature by adding the newly developed, synthetic drugs it could not ban under the 
1961 agreement (like barbiturates, amphetamines, LSD and the like) to the UN’s schedules of 
illicit substances. Recognizing the possibility that newer drugs made with different substances 
could later be produced after the agreement’s establishment, Article 2 of the amended treaty 
leaves open the possibility for new substances to be added to the UN’s schedules.28 In this 
manner, if any new substance produces similar effects to those already listed in the existing 
schedules; and if the WHO determines a substance to be a (possible) public or societal health risk 
due to abuse, the organization can recommend its proscription. Such recommendation will then 
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be taken into consideration by the UN and appropriate scheduling of the substance will follow (if 
proscription is agreed upon).29 Much like its predecessor, the 1971 amended agreement enjoys 
considerable acceptance within the international community with 183 members party to its 
stipulations.   
       
The last, and most recent, drug-related UN agreement is the 1988 United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Unlike the two previous 
agreements, which were created to outline exactly which substances were prohibited, the 1988 
Convention focused specifically on controlling the cross-border trafficking of illicit substances 
and the organized criminal activity associated with these practices. Signatories, in this manner, 
not only obliged to work together to eradicate drug smuggling, but also agreed to punitively 
penalize all activities relating to drug manufacturing, trade, even and possession under their own 
domestic laws.30 Unlike the previous two treaties—neither of which explicitly outlined nor 
prescribed punitive laws as a way of handling the issue of possession specifically—the 1988 
Convention calls for such measures. With 189 countries currently party to the 1988 agreement, it 
remains the most widely accepted and possibly the most stringent Convention of the three.31 
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
 
Each of the following chapters will focus on achieving the research aims above first by 
elaborating on the theoretical frameworks already discussed and then by applying these models 
to the norm of international drug prohibition more specifically. 
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With this in mind then, Chapter 2 will begin by defining what an international norm is with the 
help of available insights from constructivist norms research. By making use of this definition, 
the chapter will go on to argue that international drug prohibition is, in fact, a norm. Following 
this, an explanation of Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘norm life-cycle’ will follow and provide a more 
systematic way of understanding prohibition’s emergence on the international stage. The chapter 
will conclude by demonstrating that while the life cycle is indeed applicable in tracing the 
development of the norm of international drug prohibition, it cannot adequately explain why the 
norm continues to exist today against all evidence of its ineffectiveness.   
 
Following from this, chapter 3 will start by introducing Coxian critical theory to the discussion 
and presenting some of the major insights of his work. Of particular importance for this study 
will be Cox’s concept of hegemony, as well as his idea of the historical structure as being “a 
particular configuration of forces” between material capabilities, ideas, and institutions.32 After 
this introduction, an analysis of Cox’s insights will follow and thereby demonstrate the 
applicability of his arguments in explaining the norm of international drug prohibition. 
      
Chapter 4 will continue with an analysis and then an application of these theoretical frameworks 
to the norm of international drug prohibition. This chapter will specifically seek to demonstrate 
how the two models, when used in conjunction, provide a more comprehensive way of 
understanding global drug prohibition. 
  
The study will then conclude with Chapter 5 by reviewing the findings discussed. It will also 
briefly explore other possible areas of research out of the purview of this paper and will include 
final comments regarding some alternative ways of dealing with the drug issue on an 
international level.    
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE NORM LIFE CYCLE 
2.1 Overview 
In order to show that international drug prohibition is in fact a norm, it is necessary at the outset 
to understand what a norm is; the process by which norms become important on an international 
level; and subsequently, how and when norms become embedded in the institutional fabric of 
international society. The section that follows will seek to provide such a framework for further 
analysis. At the outset, the chapter will begin—with the help of constructivist norms research—
by conceptualising what a norm is and how norms influence international political behaviour. 
Succeeding from that, an overview of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle will 
follow detailing specifically the three stages of their model: (1) norm emergence; (2) norm 
cascade; and (3) internalization.33 The chapter will then conclude with a critique of Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s framework arguing that while the model is indeed helpful in systematizing the 
process of norm evolution, there are some flaws in the authors’ argumentation. 
  
2.2 What is a Norm?  Some Considerations and Conceptualisations 
 
While many theoretical approaches discuss the role of norms in global politics, few but 
constructivism consider them of central importance in understanding interstate relations. As 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, constructivists largely question the material explanations that 
neoliberals and neorealists provide in IR and instead maintain that even material objects “must 
[first] be understood through the social concepts [or ideas] that define their meaning for human 
life.”34 Constructivists see the world—including the relations between states, national interests, 
state identities, and the like—as being socially-constructed products of human agency. Similarly, 
while most mainstream theories tend to emphasize the role of agency over structure (or vice 
                                               
 
33
 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 896. 
25 
 
 
versa) to explain state behaviour, constructivists argue that agents and structures are in fact 
mutually constitutive and thus, cannot be completely divorced from nor assimilated by one 
another.35 As products of human agency, international norms that structure, regulate and define 
the behaviour of states cannot exist apart from or a priori to those actors who create and support 
them. 
 
For matters of conceptualisation, a norm is considered in this study as a “standard of appropriate 
behaviour for members of a given identity.”36 Put differently, norms detail how actors, who 
identify themselves as members of a group, should behave within certain situations. Not only 
does this definition suggest that norms are intersubjectively held by those who individuals or 
groups who subscribe to them, but that they play an integral role in shaping identity and in turn 
behaviour. Thus, in the context of international relations, more specifically, norms delineate 
appropriate action for states (and other actors relevant to global society) as well shape the 
identity of the states themselves. Three separate (but not mutually exclusive) categories are 
commonly used to distinguish between different kinds of norms. The first category, labelled 
regulative norms, are those that prohibit, order, or restrict the behaviour of actors within a certain 
context. Constitutive norms, the second group or classification, “create new actors, interests, or 
categories of action”37; and finally, evaluative norms define how states ought to behave on the 
global stage by distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour.38  
 
Beyond simple definitions, another issue to bear in mind when discussing norms in IR is the 
multi-faceted relationship that exists between domestic norms and international ones. In this 
manner, not only do most international norms arise from the domestic level first, but to be of any 
real consequence on state behaviour, they must necessarily filter and work their way through 
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existing domestic structures.39 On a more theoretical note, most first-wave norms research 
(which includes Finnemore and Sikkink’s work) focuses primarily on the acceptance of global 
norms by means of ‘international prescriptions’40 which provide states with general instructions 
on how to act regardless of specific contextual dynamics. More recent studies, labelled second 
and third wave research, examine the process by which domestic factors localise and shape 
global norms to fit domestic circumstances.41 For an exploratory study such as this, however, the 
localization factor is of less concern (though not of any less importance) than the actual diffusion 
process. 
      
2.3 The Norm Life Cycle—Explaining the Model 
 
With definitions now established, it is possible to begin outlining the norm life cycle as posited 
by Finnemore and Sikkink. As Figure 1 demonstrates below, the norm life cycle consists of three 
distinct stages with stages 1 and 2 being separated by an intermediary phase (also known as the 
tipping point). Each stage, according to Sikkink and Finnemore, involves different social 
processes, primary actors, and modes of influence at work that help to sustain and promote the 
norm further. It is important to point out (as the scholars themselves appropriately do) that 
change from one stage to another is not inexorable.42 Instead, as will be further discussed at the 
end of this chapter, some norms matter more than others, some norms fail to reach the 
internalization phase, and others do not gain widespread acceptance at all. Before discussing 
which norms are of greatest importance, however, it is first necessary to examine the different 
phases of the life cycle itself.    
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Figure 1—The Norm Life Cycle43 
2.3.1  Norm emergence 
 
As the name suggests, the first stage in Finnemore and Sikkink’s model outlines the process 
whereby international norms emerge and begin to gain momentum on the global stage. While 
norms arise for a variety of different reasons usually relating to context-specific circumstances, 
Sikkink and Finnemore argue there are discernible elements similar amongst all emergent 
norms—the most prominent of which are the presence of norm entrepreneurs and organizational 
platforms for action.44 Since both of these elements are central to understanding the emergence 
stage more fully, further elucidating upon them is a necessary task. 
 
To begin then, norm entrepreneurs are those individuals, or groups of individuals, who bring 
attention to an issue and seek to change (what they consider) inappropriate behaviour. More 
specifically, norm entrepreneurs create or problematize issues by “using language that names, 
interprets, and dramatizes them.”45 In doing so, norm entrepreneurs explicitly seek to change 
public discourse on the issue at hand thereby challenging what Sikkink, Finnemore and other 
academics label the pre-existing ‘logics of appropriateness’.46 When a new norm emerges, in 
other words, it directly confronts or clashes with the prevailing norms or standards of behaviour 
at the time. 
 
                                               
 
43 Ibid., 896. 
44
 Ibid., 896. 
45
 Ibid., 897. 
28 
 
 
Without question, the process of changing societal perceptions and reframing issues is a difficult 
task for norm entrepreneurs to assume and because of this, understanding their motivations 
becomes an important area of concern for norm researchers. From Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
perspective, norm entrepreneurs often act out of compassion (empathy); for common humanity 
(altruism); or in belief of the virtue of their ideas (ideational commitment).47 Although it is 
reasonable to argue that some norm entrepreneurs act for entirely benevolent reasons, it seems 
too idealistic to assume that all norm entrepreneurs do so in every instance of norm emergence or 
that all international norms are necessarily progressive in substance. While further elaboration on 
this point will follow in the concluding remarks of this chapter, suffice it to say that Finnemore 
and Sikkink overlook instrumentality as a possible motivation for action. 
        
In order to successfully challenge the existing standards of behaviour, norm entrepreneurs must 
also have an organizational platform through which to act. Such a platform allows the 
entrepreneurs to publicly promote the issue in hopes of persuading others to agree to their 
reinterpretation. Already existing international organisations or institutions are one kind of 
organizational platform that norm entrepreneurs often make use of. However, as Finnemore and 
Sikkink suggest, international organisations come with their own norms and programmes for 
action which, in turn, often influence and determine the content and specificity of new norms.48 
On the other hand, it is also possible for norm entrepreneurs to create their own organizational 
platforms from which to work. Some transnational organizations and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), like Oxfam and CARE International, are some more well-known 
examples of such platforms. 
         
Beyond norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms though, Sikkink and Finnemore 
maintain that state endorsement is another key element important in the emergent stage of a 
norm’s life. More specifically, states must endorse the reinterpretation promoted by the norm 
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entrepreneurs and agree to support and promote it on an international level. What makes 
transition to the second stage even more likely is the institutionalisation of these new ideas into 
more formal international arrangements or agreements. By clearly setting out rules and 
specifying what constitutes compliance or violation, the newly emerging norm becomes more 
deeply embedded in the fabric of international society. 
 
2.3.2  Tipping Point 
 
Before moving on to discuss the second stage, it is important to explain the intermediary phase 
that fits in between stage 1 and 2—what Sikkink and Finnemore label the tipping (or threshold) 
point. Quite simply, the tipping point occurs when a norm goes from being only minimally 
accepted by a few states to being more widely endorsed and promoted by a variety of states. 
While it is difficult to know exactly how and when this threshold peaks, Sikkink and Finnemore 
posit that a ‘critical mass’ of states—or approximately one-third of all the states in the system at 
the time—need to accept the norm for the tipping point to be reached.49 While this figure is 
mostly an approximation and not necessarily an exact science (though the authors do base the 
number off of empirical studies), the one-third figure does give researchers an idea as to when 
the tipping point might occur. What is also important to consider in this intermediary phase are 
the kinds of states endorsing and supporting the norm. Some states that have great power, 
expansive wealth, or even international prestige, for instance, may hold more weight or 
persuasive power than others in the international system and can thus be considered more 
important when it comes to endorsing and supporting a norm.50    
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2.3.3  Norm Cascade 
 
Once a ‘critical mass’ of states support the new ‘logic of appropriateness’, a cascade begins to 
occur whereby more and more countries adopt the norm without internal pressure to do so.51 At 
this stage, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, the mechanisms of influence begin to change. Put 
differently, while domestic actors and internal pressures are the most important forces of 
persuasion in the emergent stage, in the cascade phase states themselves and international society 
more generally become the agents of persuasion or—to use Finnemore and Sikkink’s term—
socialization. With regards to how socialization actually occurs, the authors suggest that norm-
leading states, alongside transnational organizations and groups of norm entrepreneurs, influence 
those actors not in compliance with the new ‘logics of appropriateness’ by means of sanctions, 
material incentives/disincentives, and public praise or criticism.52 
  
These external pressures alone, Finnemore and Sikkink maintain, cannot completely account for 
why so many states begin to adopt the norm at this stage and why the cascade itself happens so 
quickly. Instead, norm compliance in stage 2 also directly relates to notions of identity and the 
state’s place as a member of the international community.53 More specifically, since a state’s 
self-identity originates in large part from the institutions and social contexts it involves itself in, 
states will thus seek to support norms adopted by the community it sees itself a member of in 
order to ‘fit in’ or belong. To articulate their point, Sikkink and Finnemore point to three 
identity-related reasons to explain why states adapt and conform to international pressure: 
legitimation, conformity, and esteem.54  
 
Legitimation, to give but a brief overview, refers to the state’s feelings of acceptance and 
correctness in global society. States, in this manner, not only want to feel a part of the 
international community, but also seek to gain approval from it as well as they realise the 
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negative effects that come from being ostracized within the system. Besides this, states may also 
seek international legitimation as a way of furthering or solidifying their own domestic 
legitimacy. As Finnemore and Sikkink themselves write, “states also care about international 
legitimation because it has become an essential contributor to perceptions of domestic legitimacy 
held by a state’s own citizens.”55 In this manner, norm-conforming behaviour can thus be said to 
work for states on both the international and domestic level. 
 
Conformity, in contrast, refers to the state’s feelings of belonging within global society. Put 
differently, by conforming to the appropriate behaviour promulgated by the international 
community, states see themselves as being part of the ‘in-group’.56 Esteem, on a different but 
related note, does not come solely from the feelings of pride associated with norm-conforming 
behaviour, but also comes from the perceptions other states have of those that conform to the 
‘logics of appropriateness’. As Finnemore and Sikkink maintain, adopting new norms for reasons 
of esteem and conformity have much to do with seeking approval from others in the international 
community and, in turn, avoiding dissention.57 In other words, states care what others think of 
them and seek to avoid behaviour that hurts their prestige or status. 
   
2.3.4  Internalization 
 
The last stage in the norm life cycle is the internalization phase wherein a norm becomes so 
widely accepted that (almost) every member of the international community endorses or supports 
it. It is at this point that a norm appears immutable and goes largely unchallenged by the 
international community. For Sikkink and Finnemore, this assumed, given quality is quite 
powerful as the norm itself goes largely unquestioned by those who support it and there is 
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relatively little, if any, discussion taking place about whether or not states should conform to the 
norm altogether.58 
 
One key mechanism of influence in this third stage is the creation of professions which relate to 
the norm.  The individuals working in these professions—who are trained and instilled with job-
specific, technical knowledge—often have a direct impact on the kinds of policies adopted by 
governments, international organizations (IOs), and transnational networks due to the sought-
after nature of professionalization within these establishments. As such, Finnemore and Sikkink 
suggest, many governments and IO policies often reflect the professional, technical and 
“normative biases of the professions that staff decision-making agencies.”59 These professions 
ultimately serve to reinforce, perpetuate, and strengthen the norm further. 
 
In addition to the existence of norm-specific, technical professions, another key mechanism at 
work in the internalization phase is that of reiteration and habit.60 Although Sikkink and 
Finnemore do not elaborate too extensively on this argument, they suggest that repeated patterns 
of behaviour within international society become internalized and eventually lead to slower, 
evolutionary normative changes over time. In other words, iterated habit may in itself be a force 
at work in sustaining a norm and may suggest that normative change is a slow, but continuing 
process. 
 
2.4 What Kinds of Norms Matter and When? 
 
Although not specifically included in any of the three stages already outlined, another question 
norms researchers must ask is which norms matter most in the international system and under 
what circumstances this is so.61 From their own examination of the relevant norms literature, 
Sikkink and Finnemore cite legitimation, prominence, intrinsic characteristics, path dependency, 
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and world-time context as potential reasons why some norms, as opposed to others, manage to 
reach the later stages of the life cycle.62 While it is not necessary to give an extensive overview 
of each of these hypotheses, it is important to outline the basic premises of each. 
           
To begin then, the first potential reason—legitimation—relates directly to the same concept 
discussed in stage 2 whereby states endorse international norms in order to appear more 
legitimate both on a domestic and international level. Since accepting international norms 
increases domestic legitimacy, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest, it is likely that some states will 
strongly endorse or begin supporting international norms most when their internal legitimacy is 
coming under pressure or is in jeopardy.63 Prominence, on the other hand, relates not only to the 
substance of the norm itself, but also to the kinds of states adopting the norm (similar to the 
esteem concept also discussed in stage 2). In this manner, powerful states or those held in high 
esteem are often a model of emulation for others; thus, when these well-regarded countries 
support an international norm, other countries seeing such action will want to follow suit out of a 
desire to emulate or be like these norm leaders.64 Path dependency, to jump ahead, refers to the 
relationship between old norms and new ones. More precisely, Sikkink and Finnemore maintain 
that emerging norms similar or comparable to already existing ones may have greater pulling 
power over those emerging norms without such a basis. Undoubtedly, all of these possibilities 
are important for understanding international norm dynamics; yet, in the context of global drug 
prohibition, Sikkink and Finnemore’s world-time context and intrinsic characteristic hypotheses 
need a little more explanation as they will be particularly useful in the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 4. 
  
Beginning with the idea of intrinsic characteristics then, Sikkink and Finnemore claim that some 
norms are inherently more influential than others in the international system due to their very 
substance and specificity. Durable, long standing, very clearly articulated norms (often those 
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institutionalized in the frameworks of international organizations) are likely to be more 
influential than those that are less well-defined.65 Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink maintain, 
some norms are substantively more powerful than others because they speak to a common 
humanity. Those norms considered universalistic in nature, in other words, may have more sway 
than those that are localized or regionally specific; likewise, norms that are more humanistic, that 
seek to protect innocent people from bodily harm, may be widely accepted as they “resonate with 
basic ideas of human dignity common to most cultures.”66 While the authors do not specifically 
mention the norm of drug prohibition in their study, it is likely (as further examination in 
subsequent chapters will seek to demonstrate) that one of the many reasons prohibition 
succeeded in the first place was that it embodied some intrinsic quality. 
 
The last factor that might determine how or more appropriately when a norm becomes influential 
on the international stage are the events happening in the world at the time. As any political 
scientist or historian knows, events matter and new discoveries, costly wars, economic failures, 
and the like are all important occurrences that drastically change the socio-political context in 
which states act. Novel experiences force states to “search for new ideas and norms”67 to help 
them cope with the unknown. Considering that attempts at global drug prohibition first began at 
a time when substances were just beginning to be synthesized into more addictive products (i.e. 
cocaine and morphine), the time-world context is an important variable to keep in mind when 
studying the norm itself. Yet, this idea will be further expanded upon in the analyses of 
subsequent chapters. 
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2.5 Limitations of the Norm Life Cycle Model 
 
Now that an outline of the norm life cycle is complete, a few words need to be said about the 
limitations of Sikkink and Finnemore’s framework and of norms research more broadly. The 
intention behind such a critical assessment is not to negate the model’s usefulness (as the 
framework itself is undoubtedly useful in explaining the norm of global drug prohibition), but 
rather to demonstrate some of the gaps left unexplained by the model more generally. By 
bringing attention to these limitations, the motivations behind supplementing the model with a 
second, more critical theoretical framework become clearer. 
 
Perhaps the largest weakness in the norm life cycle framework—and of norms research in 
general—stems directly from the seemingly inherent immeasurability of norms themselves.68 
Thus, even though Finnemore and Sikkink provide a neat model for explaining the evolution of 
norms, the process itself is by no means scientific or precise. While one scholar might argue that 
the tipping point in a norm’s life occurred at time x, another might provide just as much evidence 
to conclude it peaked at point y. Due to the very nature of the subject, it often becomes difficult 
to say with any real exactness when one stage in the life cycle starts and when another ends. 
   
On a separate but related note, it is difficult to apply a 'one-size-fits-all’ model to explain the 
evolution of all norms since not every norm is the same. Some norms, for instance, are more 
powerful than others (like sovereignty), others more institutionalized in certain contexts (like 
human rights), and still others more subtle. While mentioning such difference does not imply that 
Sikkink and Finnemore’s model is futile—as it would not be a part of this study if this was the 
case—it does indicate, however, that the norm-life cycle needs case-specific reworking if it is to 
properly explain the causal mechanisms and evolutionary processes at work in a norm’s life.  
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Although later (and even earlier) research has addressed this next issue,69 one of the largest gaps 
left unexplored in Sikkink and Finnemore’s study relates to the instrumental power of norms. 
While the authors do elaborate on which and why certain norms are more influential than others 
in international politics, they leave out instrumentality as a factor in their discussion. Such an 
oversight is problematic for a number of reasons, the most important of which being that norms 
often emerge and remain in place because they serve some kind of purpose for those that support 
and abide by them. The suffragettes of the past and the female voters of the present (to use one of 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s own examples) support a woman’s right to vote not only because they 
believe the idea to be morally correct, but also because voting allows them an actual say in the 
politics of their communities, societies, and countries. Similarly, most states in the international 
system support the norm of state sovereignty because doing so simultaneously reinforces their 
own territorial integrity. The above argument should not imply that instrumentality is any more 
important than those reasons Finnemore and Sikkink suggest for why norms matter, just that 
instrumentality does play at least some role in the sustaining of international norms. 
 
While the authors do acknowledge the role that powerful states have in supporting and pushing 
international norms further, they do not fully give weight to the more basic, underlying power 
relations that exist in the international system. Put differently, Sikkink and Finnemore mention, 
but do not fully explain why it is that some states have more influence in pushing norms further 
than others.70 Considering that international relations is all about explaining interstate interaction 
and power dynamics, however, it is important to question exactly why it is that one state or a 
group of states have more power in creating and sustaining norms and for what reasons this is so. 
The importance of power relations becomes even more important when a norm itself proves 
ineffectual or even in some cases detrimental to states (as with the case of international drug 
prohibition), yet continues to survive. In such instances, it is necessary to examine the power and 
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influence of those who support the norm and how such power affects international society as 
whole. Such questions and concepts about power and power relations will be of central focus in 
the chapter that follows. 
 
As a final point, while Sikkink and Finnemore do discuss the relationship that exists between 
domestic and international norms, they do not consider the possibility that some international 
norms reach the internalization phase precisely because they ‘fit’ nicely into the domestic 
political atmosphere of states. In the case of international drug prohibition specifically, as will be 
evidenced in subsequent chapters, the norm did not run counter to any major domestic political 
or financial interests for most members of the international community—instead, prohibition was 
(and still is) a politically viable, and sometimes even popular, way of handling the drug issue 
domestically. This ‘fit’ between the domestic and international spheres can ultimately help 
integrate a norm further into the fabric of both international and domestic political societies.     
                                
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Without question, the norm life cycle provides a neat way of understanding international norms 
and of tracing norm development over time. By making use of Sikkink and Finnemore’s model, 
more specifically, researchers are able to show how different causal mechanisms and influences 
work at different points in a norm’s life. Yet, as with any theoretical framework, there are some 
limitations in the life cycle model that need to be adjusted or reworked in order to explain the 
evolution of some norms. Failing to include instrumentality and power dynamics within the norm 
life cycle, in this manner, are some of the two largest limitations of Sikkink and Finnemore’s 
framework pointed out in this chapter. Bearing this in mind then, Chapter 3 will seek to fill in 
some of these gaps by adding the concepts of power and hegemony to the discussion on 
international norms and norm diffusion.        
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CHAPTER 3: 
ROBERT COX’S CRITICAL THEORY 
3.1 Overview 
Considering that the norm life-cycle model addresses the role of power relations only partly, and 
very briefly in its formulation, it is necessary to supplement the framework with an alternative, 
more critical approach to better explain the role of power in shaping inter-state interactions, and 
international norms. By outlining the work of critical scholar Robert Cox and in focusing 
specifically on his conceptualization of hegemony, this section will introduce a more complex, 
nuanced interpretation of power that—as chapter 4 will show—is particularly relevant when 
examining the case of international drug prohibition. The chapter will thus begin with a brief 
discussion about critical theory and Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) more specifically.71 
Succeeding from that, a detailed explanation of Cox’s understanding of hegemony will follow 
with particular attention being paid to his notion of historical structures. Finally, to conclude, the 
chapter will close with a few critical remarks about Cox’s framework and the difficulties in 
applying some of his ideas to the study of international drug prohibition more specifically. 
     
3.2 Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) – What is it? 
 
As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, critical theory is an approach to international relations that is 
both normative and evaluative in nature. Critical theorists, in this manner, concern themselves 
both with critiquing the seemingly immutable tenets of mainstream approaches while, at the 
same time, theorising about the real world in hopes of changing it.72 Methodologically, instead of 
formulating abstract, ahistorical, scientific-like laws to understand and explain reality (as is 
common in neorealism and neoliberalism), critical theorists recognise the importance of 
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historical context in understanding the social world and maintain that all knowledge is relative to 
time and space. In both practice and theory then, the social world is not given, but created and 
changeable over time.73  From this view, most critical theorists would agree, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) for a scholar to be completely objective or separated from his theorising. Rather, as 
Cox himself so aptly demonstrates, “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”74 
      
While all critical theorists broadly subscribe to these views, variation does exist between scholars 
in the critical approach. Robert Cox’s work, for instance, differs quite substantially from that of 
the Frankfurt scholars, New Marxists, and world systems theorists that also fit under the general 
bracket of critical theory.75 Although CCT is itself inspired by Marxism to some degree, it more 
closely follows the writings of Italian writers Giambattista Vico and Antonio Gramsci amongst 
others. Given this influence, Cox’s work speaks to both the prevailing economic relations 
dominant within the international system (akin to Marxist-inspired thinkers), but also goes 
beyond this to explain—following Gramsci’s concept of hegemony—how these social relations 
are sustained by those in power through both political and cultural means. Properly 
understanding the social world, in Cox’s view, requires a consideration of “the mutually 
reinforcing and reciprocal relationships between the socioeconomic relations […] and political 
and cultural practices […] that together underpin a given order.”76 Focusing solely on economic, 
ideational, or material concerns in one’s analysis (as is common amongst critical theorists, 
constructivists, and mainstream theorists alike) is simply creating an incomplete picture of world 
order from Cox’s perspective. 
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3.3 Hegemony – Gramscian Influences 
 
Although the above portrayal of Cox’s work is brief, it allows for an introduction into his 
interpretation of hegemony which is, without question, the most important of his ideas in the 
context of this research. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Cox’s understanding of the concept goes 
beyond that which is commonly associated with the term in mainstream IR discourse. Thus, 
while most scholars would define hegemony as one state having greater power than all (or most) 
others in the international system—with power being understood purely in materialist terms—
Cox develops a more comprehensive interpretation of the concept that considers material, 
ideational, and even institutional factors in its definition.77 Given the complexity of his writings, 
in this manner, properly understanding Cox first requires a deeper examination into some of his 
own theoretical influences—with particular emphasis being paid to Gramsci. Considering, in this 
manner, that most of his writings on hegemony stem either directly or indirectly from Gramscian 
ideas, it is difficult to analytically separate Cox’s interpretation of the concept without discussing 
Gramsci first. 
 
According to Cox himself, the Gramscian notion of hegemony developed as a result of two 
distinct influences on the Italian writer’s life: the first being his participation in the Third 
International, debating ideas about the prospects for socialism in Europe; and the second being 
his interest in the writings of Machiavelli.78 With regards to the first instance then, Gramsci 
differed from most other socialist thinkers of the time (like Lenin) by applying the concept of 
hegemony to explain the dominance of the bourgeoisie capitalist class over the lower classes in 
European societies.79 In Gramsci’s view, the more powerful the bourgeoisie in a country, the 
more embedded and natural capitalism, and the social relations associated with it, became within 
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the society itself. To attain this position of power, Gramsci maintained, the bourgeoisie grants 
certain allowances to the lower classes in exchange for compliance to their leadership.80 Not only 
do these compromises solidify the position of the bourgeoisie, Gramsci posited, they also “lead 
[…] to forms of social democracy which preserve capitalism while making it more acceptable to 
workers and the petty bourgeoisie.”81 Put differently, in granting small concessions, the powerful 
consolidate their leadership further by making their hegemony more amenable and ultimately, 
more legitimate to those with less power. 
 
On a separate but related note, it was through the political institutions of civil society (i.e. the 
church, the family unit, the press, the workplace, etc.) that these hegemonic social and economic 
relations became further sustained and legitimated.82 In Gramsci’s thinking, the bourgeoisie held 
a vast amount of power—power that went beyond even the state apparatus insofar as it had 
socio-economic and political consequences as well. For this reason, bourgeoisie hegemony 
penetrated all social relations, including the institutions of civil society. When hegemony was 
firmly entrenched, these institutions, “helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and 
expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order.”83 From the Gramscian perspective, 
hegemonic power relations encompass and affect all spheres of life. 
   
Such an interpretation of hegemony juxtaposes itself nicely to the second influence on Gramsci’s 
thinking—the Machiavellian conception of power. Symbolised metaphorically by the image of a 
centaur (a creature both half-beast and half-man), Machiavelli argued that power is not simply a 
manifestation of brute force; rather, power is a “necessary combination of consent [man] and 
coercion [beast].”84 Thus, even while the threat of force may ultimately buttress power relations 
and can be used when necessary, it is actually continued acquiescence that (most often) 
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legitimates and allows for these relations to remain stable. As Cox writes, “Hegemony is enough 
to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time.”85 
 
Without question then, Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony is comprehensive. On the one 
hand, he discusses the prevalent socioeconomic factors that both create and perpetuate 
hegemonic social relations (i.e. when the bourgeoisie grants lower classes concessions in 
exchange for hegemonic consent which in turn naturalises the given order); on the other hand, 
however he also considers the mutually consensual and latent coercive capacities that underpin 
all power relations. With regards to the research at hand, more specifically, it is this complex, 
nuanced understanding of power—and hegemony in the broader sense—that Cox assumes in his 
own writing. Instead of using the concept to explain class and economic relations on a domestic 
level, however, Cox transposes this Gramscian notion to explain world order in an international 
context. 
 
3.4 Hegemony and Historical Structures—Cox’s View on International 
Relations 
 
Now that his Gramscian-inspired ideas have been detailed at length, it is possible to begin 
outlining Cox’s own work on IR and hegemony more explicitly. To begin then, in Cox’s oft-
cited essay “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, 
he points to the presence of ‘historical structures’ as representations of differing power relations 
over time. In Cox’s view, a historical structure necessarily comprises of three distinct, yet 
reciprocal forces: ideas, material capabilities, and institutions (see Figure 2).86 When these three 
forces ‘fit’ together and encourage the dominant modes of thinking and prevailing power 
relations, Cox argues, hegemony prevails. When power relations are less noticeable at any given 
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time, on the other hand, hegemony cedes and becomes less determinate of international affairs.87 
These prevailing power relations, on a separate but related note, are hegemonic when considered 
natural and legitimate by most (or all) of those concerned. Coercion—in the form of destructive 
material capabilities—may ultimately underpin these hegemonic structures, but (in following 
from Gramsci’s line of thinking), do not continue to exist solely due to the capacity for force. By 
briefly outlining each of these forces in turn, it becomes clear exactly how extensive Cox’s 
understanding of hegemony is. 
 
 
 
Figure 2—Cox’s Representation of Historical Structures88 
3.4.1 Material Capabilities 
 
Not oblivious to their importance in structuring and determining interstate relations, Cox 
includes material capabilities as one of the three main forces that underpin any historical 
structure. Similar to what most neorealists would claim, Cox maintains that material capabilities 
refer not only to the strength and coordination of the military and armed forces, but also to the 
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technological capacities, amount of natural resources, and wealth that a country (or a group of 
allied countries) has at its disposal.89  
 
3.4.2 Ideas 
 
Alongside material capabilities, Cox argues there are also two groups of ideas that buttress 
historical structures and underpin hegemonic power: intersubjective meanings and collective 
images. Intersubjective meanings, in Cox’s view, relate to those widely-shared, historically-
derived ideas regarding “the nature of social relations […that] perpetuate habits and expectations 
of behavior”90 for the actors of world politics. Collective images, on the other hand, refer more to 
the distinct and sometimes opposing beliefs that different people (and groups of people) have 
about social order more generally. Put differently, while the former would focus on the ‘rules’ of 
interstate interaction—like how states should properly conduct their international affairs both in 
times of conflict and compromise—the latter would instead emphasize the differences of 
perspective in regards to the legitimacy of the prevailing power relations.91 Hegemony exists, in 
the manner, when both the intersubjective meanings and collective images perpetuate (or at the 
very least do not contradict) those ideas consistent with the prevailing power relations of the 
time. 
 
3.4.3 Institutions 
 
The final aspect of the ‘historical structure’ model is the role of institutions. As Cox argues and 
as most IR scholars would agree, international institutions are often created by those in power 
and, in most cases, tend to reflect the ideas and “collective images consistent with [the 
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prevailing] power relations.”92 Thus, while institutions can sometimes develop a life of their 
own, they often have a unique role in stabilizing the hegemonic order. Cox, more specifically, 
identifies two primary ways in which institutions help accomplish this task. The first relates back 
to Gramsci’s idea about the strong granting concessions to the weak in order to ensure 
acquiescence to hegemonic leadership.93 In this manner, by granting the weak representation, by 
offering monetary assistance, by providing security agreements, and the like, the strong—via 
these institutions—ensure consent and thus legitimacy to their leadership. With regards to Cox’s 
second point, on a separate but related matter, these institutions also allow the strong to express 
their interests in a universalised (as opposed to an individual) manner. In doing so, the interests 
and ideas of a few are represented as the interests of all. Such universalism, combined with the 
granted concessions, mitigates dissent and ultimately, mollifies those with less power to consent 
to the existing power relations. 
   
3.5 Limitations of Cox’s Insights 
 
Much like the norm life-cycle model, or any other theoretical framework more generally, there 
are some limitations in applying Cox’s ideas to the case study of international drug prohibition. 
Considering, for instance, that Cox’s work is focused predominantly on understanding world 
order in the broadest sense of the term, it becomes difficult to isolate only those ideas that are 
applicable to case-specific, real-world phenomena without losing the complexities inherent in his 
works. More specifically, since Cox incorporates so many social, cultural, economic, and 
political variables into his writings while, at the same time, acknowledging the 
interconnectedness of these variables as well, it becomes difficult to apply his ideas to one 
specific instance without being necessarily parsimonious. 
 
Another limitation to mention is the difference in focus between Cox’s writings more generally 
and the study at hand. Considering, in this manner, that Cox was one of the first theorists to 
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distinguish the field of International Political Economy (IPE) from international relations, his 
work often places greater emphasis on the role of economics in determining international 
affairs—at least in comparison to most mainstream IR scholars. Seeing as this study does base 
itself almost entirely from an IR standpoint, it does include economic factors in its analyses, but 
not to the same degree that Cox might. Again, Cox’s work includes so many elements that only 
some are readily applicable to the case study of international drug prohibition. It is beyond the 
scope and intention of this paper, moreover, to discuss at great length how the dominant mode of 
production influences the world economy and international affairs.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Regardless of individual differences in opinion, most scholars of international relations would 
agree that power—however defined—is inherently important in determining almost all of the 
affairs between states. As such, it is impossible to analyse any phenomenon in IR without 
mentioning the role that power plays in determining state action. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, Cox’s understanding of power (and hegemony in its wider conceptualization) is 
comprehensive and covers almost all facets of the term. To briefly reiterate, in Cox’s view, 
power and hegemonic social relations are perpetuated not solely through material means, but also 
through collectively-held ideas and international institutions. It is thus a combination of political, 
social, and cultural forces that sustain hegemony in the international sphere.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
ANALYSIS – THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG PROHIBITON 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
Now that both theoretical models have been outlined in depth, it is possible to begin applying 
these frameworks to the case study of international drug prohibition specifically. The first part of 
this chapter, in this manner, will seek to demonstrate—through application of the life cycle 
model—exactly how the norm of international drug prohibition developed over the past century. 
Not only will this analysis establish the overall applicability of the theoretical model itself 
(notwithstanding the criticisms already addressed), but it will also demonstrate the different 
mechanisms of influence at work in each stage of the norm’s development. It will further be 
established that while the norm of prohibition did reach the internalization phase (with most or 
all states continuing to adhere to its legitimacy), it did not move through the life cycle model as 
seamlessly as laid out in Chapter 2. In other words, the path to internalization in the context of 
prohibition deviates slightly from the model’s expectations. 
 
What becomes most noticeable through the model’s application though, is the continued role of 
the US in pushing the norm further. Considering the norm’s irrefutable lack of success over the 
past century (a point to also be discussed herein), the US’ continued, ardent support for the norm 
has always played and continues to play an important role in the norm’s continued existence 
today. Power relations, in other words, play an integral role in the livelihood of drug prohibition. 
 
Following from this line of reasoning, the second half of this chapter will apply Cox’s insights 
on power and hegemony to explain the perpetuation of the norm despite its failures. Introducing 
the concept of hegemony to the case of prohibition not only allows for Sikkink and Finnemore’s 
life cycle model to be supplemented further, but also demonstrates how hegemony—and the 
ideas, institutions, and material capabilities that support it—can create and perpetuate consensual 
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expectations of state behaviour in line with the interests of the hegemonic social order. At the 
time of the norm’s emergence and throughout its cascade, to place this argument in context, the 
US and its Western allies were not only the most dominant powers in the international system, 
they were also the countries that most vehemently endorsed and encouraged international drug 
control (and eventually prohibition itself). Added to the fact that the US remains especially 
adamant in endorsing the norm today—whilst an increasing amount of drug-producing countries 
and supporters of harm reduction strategies are less supportive94—it stands to reason that 
hegemonic social relations may indeed have some part to play in explaining the norm’s survival. 
 
4.2 Application of the Norm Life-Cycle Model 
 
Starting first with an analysis of prohibition’s beginnings as a domestic norm and continuing 
through to its internalization in the form of the Conventions detailed above, the following section 
will apply the constructivist norm-life cycle framework to the case of prohibition. Through such 
application, the first objective of this study (as stated in Chapter 1) will be achieved insofar as it 
will effectively trace the development of the norm of international drug prohibition over time and 
identify the major causal mechanisms at work in the norm’s evolution.  
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4.2.1 The Impact of Domestic Norms: Some Background on Drug Prohibition 
 
Before the early twentieth century, no international agreements proscribing drug manufacturing, 
trafficking and consumption existed. Instead, for some of the world’s most dominant powers, 
drug production and trade were sources of legitimate revenue and were condoned, or at least not 
vehemently opposed, by the international community.95 It was not until 1907, with the Ten-Year 
Agreement between India, Britain and China, that the first trilateral treaty stopping the trade of a 
narcotic, in this case opium, emerged.96 Considering the agreement involved only three 
countries—wherein Britain was the imperial power, India the opium-producing colony of 
Britain, and China their primary opium consumer—it was not truly a global effort. Rather, as 
most reports suggest, the British had a relatively small role to play in furthering international 
talks on drug control and on prohibition specifically in the early years of international drug 
control. The most influential push for such negotiations instead came primarily from American 
efforts.97  
 
On the domestic front, many Western societies—including those in the US, Canada, Australia, 
and even some Scandinavian countries—were preoccupied with issues of morality and vice at 
the turn of the twentieth century.98 Within the US, to give context, various laws limiting or 
prohibiting the sale and consumption of alcohol, prostitution, drug use, and the like were adopted 
domestically and were encouraged abroad as well.99 In the case of drug prohibition specifically, a 
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number of American anti-drug advocates (from missionaries to politicians to women’s rights 
groups) denounced the manufacturing, trade and consumption of narcotics as immoral for a 
variety of humanitarian and religious reasons.100 Opium and heroin, from this view, were 
addictive substances and were harmful to consumers. Ultimately, these drugs were to be held 
responsible for ruining the moral fabric of American society and, like alcohol, were a threat to 
the country’s social and economic prosperity.101 
 
Considering that most (albeit not all) drug consumers in the US during this time were either part 
of a minority or a member of the lower class, the above argument “appealed to sectors of the 
American elite, whose paternalistic concerns regarding the vulnerability of the lower classes […] 
to drug abuse combined with fears that their economic productivity might suffer.”102 Thus, in 
calling attention to the societal harms of drug use and the potential economic consequences 
associated with it, American moral advocates were successful in achieving their desired ends: by 
the early 1910s, in this manner, there was broader public acknowledgment of the ‘drug issue’ 
within American society and an array of comprehensive federal laws implemented to prohibit the 
trade and consumption of narcotics.103 From a constructivist point of view, in other words, the 
advocates successfully challenged the existing ‘logics of appropriateness’ regarding drug trade 
and consumption within the US and effectively reframed the issue from one of relative apathy to 
one of moral and economic security.   
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4.2.2 Norm Emergence 
 
It was ultimately this combination of moralism and concern for America’s social and economic 
future that spurred their norm entrepreneurship overseas. For most anti-drug advocates, more 
specifically, the drug problem at home in the US was made worse both by the migration of 
people to the States and by the importation of such substances from abroad.104 By controlling or 
influencing international drug policy, from this line of reasoning, the problem of drug abuse 
within America itself would be better ameliorated. To put it in economic terms, from the US’ 
perspective, better control of the supply of drugs on an international level would sufficiently 
eliminate or weaken the domestic demand for them.  
 
Thus, many of the same individuals who encouraged drug prohibition on a domestic level also 
simultaneously encouraged it on an international level as well. Amongst these norm 
entrepreneurs were Bishop Charles Brent, a missionary who worked in the American-occupied 
Philippines and saw first-hand the effects of opium abuse on consumers; and Dr. Hamilton 
Wright, a well-respected and politically well-connected American physician.105 Both men 
strongly encouraged American politicians (most notably, President Theodore Roosevelt) to 
participate and take a leading role in promoting prohibition internationally throughout the early 
twentieth century.106 The organizational platforms through which these early advocates worked, 
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more specifically, were the opium agreements in Shanghai (1909) and at the Hague (1912) three 
years later. 
 
Yet, their success in convincing a critical mass of states towards the cause of prohibition 
explicitly was rather limited. As evidenced by both Brent and Wright’s own musings, it did not 
appear that most countries involved in the early talks agreed wholeheartedly with the US that the 
complete prohibition of drugs was the most expedient way to solve the drug issue.107 Arguably, 
because many of these countries had financial interests in the drug industry, completely    
eradicating the trade meant a loss of profit that, at the time, did not seem to be a desirable option 
for the majority of states involved. It must be noted here though, that even while many dominant 
states did not explicitly support prohibition at this time, it was not out of aversion for the idea 
itself. In fact, much like the US’ domestic situation, as previously mentioned, many states around 
the world deemed (recreational) drug use a social and moral ill.108 In this manner, while most 
states were relatively receptive to the idea of drug control more generally, they were simply 
unwilling to implement complete prohibition at this time. 
 
With all that said however, Brent and Wright did manage to make some strides through these 
agreements. By 1912, the twelve countries involved in the talks—most of which were from 
Western Europe, but also included the US, China, India, Siam, and Persia—agreed not only to 
prevent the trade of opium to all countries that had already prohibited its use, but also agreed to 
discourage drug abuse more generally.109 In the years following its adoption—as will be 
discussed at greater length in the following sections—the number of states signatory to its 
stipulations grew expansively as well. 
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The most prominent norm entrepreneur of mention though, without question, is Harry 
Anslinger—the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) from 1930-1962.110 
Mentioned in almost every study on the subject, Anslinger is noted for being one of the leading 
figures in the establishment of drug prohibition both within the US and internationally. 
Throughout his years in office, to give context, Anslinger opposed the idea that drug addiction 
should be considered exclusively a medical issue; instead, he labelled it a criminal and social 
problem to be remedied best by the complete eradication of supply.111 In a number of his own 
writings, Anslinger claims that solving the drug problem necessarily requires stopping the 
transnational trade and manufacturing of such substances for anything but scientific and 
medicinal use—thereby limiting the access of illicit drugs to consumers.112 Anslinger, for this 
reason, strongly encouraged US leadership in the worldwide fight against narcotics; he was 
heavily involved, for instance, in all international Conventions on drug control starting from the 
1930s through till the UN’s Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1961. Interestingly, the 
Commissioner is well-known for his rather overly-dramatized reactions, often walking out on 
national and international narcotic delegations when dissatisfied with their developments.113 
 
Yet, much like Brent and Wright before him, Anslinger’s efforts were largely met with passive 
resistance up until the 1961 Convention. The international community, in this manner, was slow 
to take up the cause of prohibition specifically despite the consistent efforts made by the US to 
convince them otherwise. Nevertheless, as seen in Appendix C, gradual incremental changes 
towards a more prohibitive global stance did occur starting with the opium agreements through 
till the Geneva Opium Convention in 1925 onwards. Thus, while Anslinger, Brent, and Wright 
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were unable to convince a critical mass of states towards prohibition explicitly at this stage, they 
did help to establish international agreements and treaties that would set the groundwork for its 
complete implementation in later years.  
 
In evidence of what Sikkink and Finnemore postulate then,114 the idea of an international drug 
control system based on prohibition developed in consequence to those domestic norms held in 
the US and other like-minded societies. Moreover, it was through the consistent effort of norm 
entrepreneurs within the US specifically that prohibition-type agreements began to develop 
concretely, albeit slowly, on the international stage. With regards to calling attention to the ‘drug 
issue’ specifically, American norm entrepreneurs were indeed successful in making the subject a 
point of discussion and priority for the international community.  
 
On the other hand, in apparent contradiction to Sikkink and Finnemore’s model, prohibition was 
neither accepted by a critical mass of states in the emergent stage nor was it explicitly 
“institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations.”115 For this reason, the 
case of drug prohibition deviates slightly (as expected) from the posited theoretical model. As 
will be demonstrated through further analysis, prohibition only reached full international 
acceptance and explicit agreement in its final internalisation phase instead of in its emergent 
stage. For this reason, global drug prohibition was a slow-going norm—only accepted 
incrementally for much of the first-half of the twentieth century; these incremental steps however 
remain relatively significant insofar as they demonstrate the international community’s growing 
proclivity for proscription overall. 
    
4.2.3 Tipping Point & Norm Cascade 
 
Considering that prohibition was not explicitly articulated in earlier international agreements and 
was in fact contested by many prominent actors, it is difficult to identify a ‘threshold’ for drug 
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prohibition based on those reference points alone. Rather, as the following discussion 
demonstrates, the norm of prohibition did not itself explicitly reach a tipping point or cascade. 
Instead, it was the idea of a drug control regime latently based on prohibitive measures that 
initially gained widespread acceptance. Aside from this deviation, however, what remains clear 
is the international community’s increasing propensity for more restrictive and prohibitive drug 
treaties throughout the early to mid-twentieth century. 
  
The most likely evidence of a tipping point—and more importantly, of a norm cascade—in 
favour of a more prohibitive stance on narcotics comes from the drastic increase in states 
accepting global drug control after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and later with the 
establishment of the League of Nations post-1920.116 When the League co-opted the stipulations 
made at the Hague, in this manner, the number of signatories to the original agreement increased 
from twelve (major) countries to nearly sixty by the mid-1920s.117 After the Geneva Opium 
Conventions in 1925, moreover, these same states agreed to discourage drug use in their 
respective countries and to accept the newly-created PCOB monitoring of narcotic imports and 
exports. The substances under specific control at this time included cocaine, heroin, morphine, 
opium, and for the first time, cannabis.118 
 
From a constructivist standpoint, there are many potential reasons why this cascade occurred. 
Considering, for instance, that the League of Nations was the first international institution of its 
kind, acceptance into the organization likely provided many of its member countries with a sense 
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of identity and belonging. In this way, by adhering to the League’s agreements, states were 
ultimately demonstrating their capacity for socialisation and their desire for international 
acceptance. Most states, from this line of reasoning, conformed to the regulations not only to ‘fit’ 
into the mould of the institution itself, but also to realise their belonging in the international 
community, to strengthen their own domestic legitimacy, and to shape their self-identity more 
generally.119 In a similar vein, if becoming a member of the international community simply 
required adherence to global drug control—which, in fact, was not hugely problematic for most 
states as it could be used advantageously in domestic political contexts anyways120—it would 
make more sense to simply agree to the stipulations adopted than to lose out on the potential 
benefits of being a part of this newly minted institution. 
              
On a separate but related note, it must be kept in mind that while the League’s cooption of earlier 
narcotic agreements saw a ‘cascade’ of states agree to global drug control, most countries still 
did not support prohibition specifically. Instead, as most reports suggest, the international 
community at the time continued to display “a general reluctance [towards penalising] non-
medical and non-scientific use of certain psychoactive substances.”121 Thus, complete 
prohibition of narcotic use still had not gained explicit support by either the League of Nations or 
the majority of individual states during the ‘cascade stage’—nor would it, as already mentioned, 
until the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 
Yet, through all of this, the US remained steadfast in the idea that narcotic supply should be 
limited and used exclusively for medicinal and scientific purposes. Even while it continued to 
play an increasingly dominant role in the various narcotic agreements during and shortly after the 
interwar period, the US remained vehemently opposed to the rest of the world’s more lenient 
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views. In consequence, the US contested (almost) every agreement that did not explicitly end all 
non-medical and scientific drug use. In some instances, the US would refuse to sign or ratify an 
agreement it deemed too lenient; at other times, it would simply leave negotiations 
completely.122 Obvious tensions, in the same vein, also existed between the US and the League 
of Nations: the former was not a member of the latter and the US, for the most part, largely 
disagreed with the permissive regulatory frameworks the League adopted. 
 
That said, the US did manage to assert its influence, in one way or another, on most of the 
international narcotic agreements established during and after the interwar period. The 
scheduling of illicit substances and national estimates created in the 1931 agreements, for 
instance, was co-created by the US, Germany, and various other dominant powers. These 
stipulations were later to become the basic template for the 1961 Convention.123 Shortly after 
WWII, in addition, the US compelled Britain and the Netherlands to end their opium monopolies 
in Asia, essentially stopping their profitable narcotic industries in these countries.124 To put it 
simply, while prohibition may not yet have been written explicitly in the form of Conventions, 
the agreements established from the 1920s through till the 1950s all demonstrate a clear, 
discernible trend towards increasing regulation and, more importantly, complete proscription. 
 
Considering the deviations already discussed between the theoretical model and the case study at 
hand, to sum up, it is difficult to argue that the norm of drug prohibition cascaded in the same 
manner that Sikkink and Finnemore hypothesise. Instead, as the above discussion demonstrates, 
it was ultimately the idea of international drug control that cascaded by the model’s 
interpretation, not the idea of prohibition itself. Despite such theoretical differences however, 
there is still reason to believe the norm of prohibition did cascade—yet, in a manner that is much 
more latent than the model allows for. More specifically, if a critical mass of states had not 
agreed to international drug regulation in the first place and thereby did not allow for 
international control to be slowly augmented over time, there would hardly be room for 
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prohibition to suddenly emerge out of thin air. Instead, at (primarily) the US’ insistence, 
proscription was perpetually discussed at international conventions and incrementally 
implemented over time. In this manner, when complete proscription became explicitly 
institutionalised and fully endorsed by the international community, it was not sudden, nor 
completely unexpected; rather, it was simply the final step in its implementation. 
 
4.2.4 Internalization 
 
Considering all of the aforementioned arguments, to continue forward, prohibition did manage to 
reach the internalization phase as posited by Sikkink and Finnemore’s model. Thus, even though 
prohibition only became institutionalized and explicitly endorsed by the international community 
in the final phase of its life, it did achieve the taken-for-granted quality that Sikkink and 
Finnemore suggest an internalized norm enjoys.125 By the time the 1961 Convention emerged 
under the prerogative of the newly-founded United Nations, in this manner, there was little 
discontent in including the stipulation to end all non-medical and scientific drug use.126  
 
Instead, by this point in time, the US had successfully asserted its leadership within the UN’s 
administrative framework and also within the specific bodies relating to drug control more 
specifically.127 It was primarily at the US’ insistence, in fact, that a Single Convention be 
established in the first place in order to consolidate all existing treaties under one agreement. 
While it originally fought for even more stringent controls than the ones discussed in previous 
sections, the US eventually settled for the terms as laid out in the current Conventions.128 
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Over the next twenty plus years, the international community continued to stand by and sign onto 
increasingly more prohibitive treaties—as evidenced through the 1971 and 1988 Conventions 
respectively. Likewise, towards the end of the twentieth century, through the joint efforts of the 
United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) and the United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the international community collectively 
devoted itself to a drastic ten-year supply reduction program. More specifically, starting in 1998 
with the UN’s campaign, “A Drug-Free World. We can do it!”129, the international community 
committed to ending all drug abuse worldwide by 2008. Although the campaign itself was 
unsurprisingly ineffectual in achieving its goals, its implementation alone demonstrates the 
contemporaneity of anti-drug sentiment and prohibition in today’s world. 
 
On a separate but related matter, if—as Sikkink and Finnemore cite—professionalization is 
another indicator of norm internalization, prohibition undoubtedly reached the final stage of the 
life cycle model. Both the INCB and the UNODC, for instance, were (and continue to be) 
agencies created for the specific purpose of ensuring national adherence to the UN’s 
international drug treaties. The INCB, on the one hand, specifically states its purpose as being a 
quasi-judicial body tasked with monitoring and evaluating its member states’ compliance with 
international treaties. When violations arise, the agency brings them to the attention of member 
parties and to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations to determine 
the severity of the violation and the appropriate steps for action.130 The UNODC, on the other 
side of the UN’s administrative framework, is responsible for helping governments implement 
supply and (more limitedly) demand-reduction programs to achieve the goal of proscription. 
Both the UNODC and the INCB, in this manner, work together and alongside national drug 
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agencies to ensure the limited supply of, trading in, and consumption of illicit substances. What 
this professionalization demonstrates most importantly is the extent to which these bodies have 
socialized the individuals working in and participating in these agencies to “value certain things 
above others”131 and to see their task as normal, standard and appropriating correct state 
behaviour. 
 
To conclude, for much of the latter half of the twentieth century and for the first decade of the 
twenty-first, prohibition enjoyed (and, for the most part, continues to enjoy) a relatively 
privileged position in International Law. Few countries, in this manner, have articulated a desire 
to withdraw from the UN treaties themselves or— with the notable exception of Uruguay—have 
implemented nationally-binding domestic legislation in direct contradiction to the agreements. 
As will be discussed in the concluding chapter, however, there has been some discussion arising 
around the issue of prohibition as of late, but it has mainly been limited to either lobbyist groups 
within civil society or within academic circles and research. While it ultimately remains too early 
to say for certain, there is a possibility that the norm of prohibition is beginning to weaken. 
 
4.2.5 Conclusion: An Evaluation of the Norm Life Cycle in Context 
 
The norm life cycle model undoubtedly provides a neat way of understanding the evolution of 
prohibition and the main causal mechanisms at work in each stage of the norm’s life. The norm 
emerged, in this manner, as a result of the efforts of domestic norm entrepreneurs; cascaded 
(latently) with the help of international socialisation and pressures for conformity; and became 
fully internalized by means of the UN Conventions, campaigns, and professions. Yet, as the 
above discussion also demonstrates, the norm did not follow the somewhat linear path that 
Sikkink and Finnemore’s model posits. Though drug prohibition, in this way, did originally 
emerge in a manner consistent with the model, it did not become institutionalised or fully 
endorsed by many states before progressing towards its cascade or internalization stage. In spite 
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of this variance, however, drug control and prohibition more specifically, did manage to reach 
complete international endorsement in the latter half of the twentieth century. It could thus be 
said that while the norm life cycle model does provide a systematic and appropriate way of 
understanding the norm of international drug prohibition, the norm itself deviates slightly from 
the model’s expectations. 
 
As a final end note, it should be noted (if it is not obvious already), the correlation that exists 
between the norm of international drug prohibition and the rise of American power 
internationally. While this statement should not and does not imply a direct causal link between 
the two, it is interesting and important to note that as the idea of international drug control and 
prohibition slowly gained acceptance, American influence within international affairs was 
growing concurrently. As will be further demonstrated later in this chapter, this correlation 
suggests that the US’ influence impacted (and continues to impact) the nature, direction, and 
preservation of international drug control treaties. 
 
4.3 The Failure of International Drug Prohibition 
 
As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, the international control and complete proscription of narcotic 
use is, and largely always has been, a relatively unsuccessful endeavour—which is only now 
being contested by some members of the international community (as will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter). As of today, a consistent rate of drug consumption exists in almost every 
country across the globe and there continues to be a vast number of criminal groups and gangs 
monopolising the drug trade. A simple examination of the current narcotic industry, as evidenced 
below, reveals just how unsuccessful prohibition actually is as a method of solving the ‘drug 
issue’ worldwide. 
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Considering, to begin, that most of the main drug-producing countries (in terms of cocaine and 
opium specifically) are some of the poorest and least developed nations in the world, it makes 
sense that drug farming often becomes a form of sustenance and livelihood for the individuals 
living there. In a world otherwise defined by insecurity, corruption, criminal gangs, and a lack of 
effective state infrastructure, becoming a drug cultivator is not always a choice, but often times a 
necessity. Although there are many international programs (and even UN initiatives) that support 
alternative forms of development for individuals in these communities, they have largely not 
been successful in inducing all cultivators to change their harvests or to eradicate their crops for 
any extended period of time.132 
 
It is also important to keep in mind both the illicit nature of these practices and similarly, the 
unreliability of national (and international) statistics in these countries. It is often difficult, in this 
manner, to put an accurate figure on the number of crops currently in existence in places like 
Afghanistan, Bolivia, Peru, Laos, and the like.133 While the lack of accurate information 
ultimately inhibits the reliability of studies conducted on the issue, what does remain clear is the 
continued presence of drug cultivation in today’s world and the underdevelopment largely 
associated with it. 
 
To switch focus, there is little doubt that the illicit drug trade continues to be a lucrative business 
worldwide. With UN estimates as high as $430 billion US dollars annually,134 the drug trade is 
undoubtedly one of the most profitable, yet notoriously dangerous industries. Indeed, illicit drug 
trafficking remains a major source of instability and crime within almost every country 
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regardless of whether it is a drug producing, drug-transitory, or drug-consuming state. In 
Mexico, for instance, drug-related murders and associated gang-related activities have been 
steadily increasing; from the period of 2006-2013, estimates claim nearly 60,000 people were 
killed due to drug-related murders.135 In the US, in contrast, drug-related killings may be less 
common, but there are still nearly 40 US-based gangs (with nearly 700,000 members in total) 
with connections to the major Mexican drug cartels.136 
 
Finally, on the consumption side of the problem, drug use and abuse continue to be major health 
problems both in developed and developing nations alike with the UNODC estimating a global 
total of 162-324 million consumers in 2014 alone. As articulated in Chapter 1, the rate of 
narcotic consumption worldwide is steadily increasing. From the period from 1998-2008, for 
instance, global opiate consumption increased from 12.9 million consumers to 17.35 million—a 
staggering jump of 34.5%. Cocaine use, similarly, went up from 13.4 million consumers to 17 
million in the same period, with a 27% total increase.137 Added to fact that drug consumers and 
abusers are often labelled criminals in most societies, high rates of incarceration for drug related 
offenses are also prevalent in many countries in the world. In December 2014 alone, the US 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) reported 96, 544 drug related arrests—nearly 48% of all total 
arrests made in that month.138 While the US is not the only country to implement such punitive 
measures—with Thailand and Russia following similar policies—the US does lead the world 
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with the highest rates of incarceration due to drug-related offenses.139 Considering the state of 
affairs in all three of these aspects, it almost goes without saying that prohibition is not in any 
way close to achieving its goals. 
 
While the above arguments might suggest a norm’s acceptability depends heavily or almost 
entirely on how successful it is in its practical implementation, it must be noted that a norm’s 
practicality (or lack thereof) does not necessarily enforce or belie its ethical relevance. Put 
differently, just because an international norm may be difficult to implement, does not mean 
there are no ethical reasons for attempting to implement it regardless. For example, some 
international issues, like human trafficking or child labour laws, are inherently difficult to 
monitor and to eradicate effectively; however, it would be problematic to argue there should be 
no laws against these practices in general – without question, the international laws currently in 
place in these circumstances can and do help protect vulnerable individuals and there is a certain 
‘appropriateness’ in their being adopted.  
 
When it comes to the subject at hand, however, a slight distinction must be made between the 
norm of prohibition and those against human trafficking or child labour. On the one hand, the 
latter norms seek to completely eradicate practices that endanger the lives and livelihood of 
already vulnerable sections of the population (mostly impoverished women and children). 
Although these laws have not yet eradicated the practices themselves, they specifically exist to 
limit and to penalize those who have done or are doing unjust harm to others – their purpose, in 
this manner, is to protect those who are vulnerable. International drug prohibition and the laws 
that support it, conversely, rest on measures of negative reinforcement and punishment for 
people who choose – of their own volition and primarily to their own bodily harm – to use drugs. 
While the objective of prohibition may be morally commendable, a ‘drug-free’ world does not 
necessarily need to come about through restrictive and punitive measures alone. Both harm 
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reduction and alternative development strategies, for instance, help achieve the same objective – 
less instances of drug use and drug cultivation overall – but ultimately rest on more positive 
approaches to dealing with the issue.  
 
4.4 Power and Hegemony: The Application of Cox’s Insights 
 
Taking due cognizance of prohibition’s ineffectuality, it is now possible to apply Cox’s insights 
on power and hegemony to help explain the norm’s continued perseverance. The section that 
follows, in this manner, will thus apply the historical structures model presented in Chapter 3 to 
the case study at hand. By doing so, the third objective of this research as defined at the outset—
that the norm of global drug prohibition continues to exist as a result of underlying power 
relations in the international system—will be effectively established. 
 
4.4.1 Power and Hegemony in Context 
 
While reading the following analysis, it is important to keep Cox’s conceptualisation of 
hegemony in mind. To give but a brief review, Cox understands hegemony not only to be a fit 
between the three configurations of forces identified below, but also as a necessary mix between 
coercion and consent.140 To put this argument into context then, global drug prohibition 
continues to exist both because the US forcefully endorses it and because the international 
community necessarily assents to US pressure. The reasons for such acceptance, as will be 
discussed at greater length in what follows, pertain specifically to the receptivity of US ideas 
alongside the concessions given by the US both financially and politically to a number of states 
(in the area of narcotic control specifically). 
 
To demonstrate this argument in specific reference to the historical structures model, the US’ 
ability to create and propagate powerful ideas on drug control and use; to lead the way in 
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international institutions like the UN; and to reinforce its influence with actual material 
capabilities, allows the US to play a determining role in sustaining current global drug treaties. 
Insofar as these three forces ‘fit’ together, in other words, the hegemony of the US (with the help 
of some like-minded, mostly Western allies) essentially guarantees prohibition to be the 
international community’s way of handling the ‘drug issue’.   
4.4.2 Ideas 
 
Starting first with the role of ideas, Cox specifically references two kinds within his historical 
structure model: intersubjective meanings and collective images. When applying these concepts 
to the case study of international drug prohibition,  intersubjective meanings refers to those 
‘rules’ of drug control as laid out in the UN, its Conventions, and its agencies. Cox’s concept of 
collective images, in contrast, refers to those views held by different groups of people—in this 
case, different states or groups of states—on the legitimacy (or morality of) drug use, 
prohibition, and the international drug control regime more generally. 
 
To begin, Cox maintains that intersubjective meanings refer specifically to those commonly-
shared ideas regarding appropriate state action that, through time, “perpetuate habits and 
expectations of behaviour.141 In the context of international narcotic control particularly, this 
concept is applicable in more ways than one (and in more ways than those listed here). For 
instance, there is the expectation that, as current signatories to the UN’s Conventions, member 
states want to end all non-medicinal and scientific drug use; likewise, in being a signatory, it is 
expected that all states will comply with the narcotic treaties and implement them within their 
own domestic contexts; finally, it is expected that all member states will abide by the INCB 
monitoring and report their usage accordingly every year. 
 
What is largely assumed by these ‘rules’, more specifically, is that all states privy to the UN’s 
Conventions—regardless of whether or not they had any hand in establishing them—will 
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implement and abide by the stipulations laid out in the agreements. These historically-derived 
notions, in this manner, have come to instill in member states the appropriate ways of handling 
the drug issue and the appropriate ways of acting. When Bolivia in 2011, in this manner, sought 
to remove the coca leaf from the UN’s schedules of illicit substances, 18 countries—most of 
which were drug-consuming states led by the US’ initiative—blocked the change citing the 
importance of “protect[ing] the integrity of the Conventions”142 as the reason for their refusal. 
Undoubtedly then, considering that these rules are a direct result of the US’ own making and that 
the US continues to insist upon their adherence today, it stands to reason their existence supports 
the US’ own interests. 
 
Cox’s notion of collective images, to change focus, can also apply to the case of US hegemony 
and international drug control insofar as that prohibition did not directly come into conflict with 
most other states’ notions of social order. To be more specific, if hegemony rests on a mix 
between consent and coercion, with consent being the more effective factor of the two, it would 
stand to reason that the state capable of producing those ideas and international agreements both 
consistent with its own interests and greatly amenable to others as well, has a decent chance of 
maintaining its hegemonic status. Put into context, the US’ role in establishing prohibition and 
institutionalising it into the fabric of international society came about largely because the idea 
itself was amenable, or at least, not in direct contradiction to many states own national interests 
or ideological views.143 By encouraging agreements that did not directly clash with other states’ 
notions of social order, in this manner, the US was able to take a leading role in further 
encouraging and maintaining prohibition. 
 
Ultimately, drug prohibition continues to exist today not only because the ideas that support it 
have become historically-conditioned in states over time, but also because they are for the most 
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part, consistent with or reflective of the US’ own actions and interests. On the other hand, many 
of the US’ (and the UN’s) current ideas on drug control and on drug use more generally do not 
come into direct conflict with those notions held by different states or groups of states. Overall, 
considering that there is little contradiction between the collective images and the intersubjective 
meanings that support the global drug system, relatively little discontent thus arises in 
maintaining the regime itself.          
   
4.4.3 Institutions 
 
The second of Cox’s three forces to discuss is that of institutions—of which the primary focus 
here will be on the UN. Unlike the League of Nations, which ultimately failed to stop World War 
II from occurring, the United Nations was originally conceived to be a more constructive 
organisation for international peace and development in the post-WWII era.144 Despite the two 
institutions having, in essence, the exact same functions, the single greatest difference between 
them related to the degree of US involvement in their existence and preservation. More 
specifically, while the US had a relatively tenuous relationship with the League of Nations and 
never actually became one of its members, it took a “leading role both in the creation of [the 
UN], and in the organization itself.” 145 
 
The most important distinction between these two periods stems from the fact that, by the mid-
twentieth century, the US had attained the superpower role it did not have beforehand (and that it 
largely continues to enjoy today).146 Before WWII, more specifically, the US was simply one 
power amongst many: Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and even Japan during the interwar 
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period had military and economic might. By the end of WWII though, with the advent of the 
Cold War and the beginning of bipolarity, the US had solidified its leading position in the world. 
Such hegemonic status, as Cox suggests, ultimately allowed the US establish an organization that 
would “reflect the power relations prevalent at the [its] point of origin.”147  
 
On a separate but related note, the universalization of international policy and the ability of the 
US to express international drug control as being in the interests of every country (and not just in 
their own particular interests) is an idea that ties in nicely, as well, to the above discussion of 
norm dynamics. In order to express international drug control as in the interests of all states, the 
US necessarily relied on moral arguments relating to those social harms created by recreational 
drug use. Through such arguments, the US was able to convince others (albeit slowly) towards 
the cause of greater global drug regulation and control. As the US maintained, it was only 
through the stringent monitoring of the international drug trade that the drug issue itself would be 
ameliorated. With regards to universalization, since 1961 with the United Nations Single 
Convention on Narcotics, the US has effectively ensured, for the most part, uniformity in the 
international community’s approach to the drug issue. Although there may be some slight 
deviations and variances within each state, most countries have criminalised drug production, 
trafficking, and consumption in their own domestic legislations. 
 
4.4.4 Material Capabilities 
 
With regards to granting concessions to weaker countries in exchange for compliance though, it 
is necessary to turn to the US’ material capabilities—considering that it is primarily through its 
wealth and military power that the US most often persuades (or compels) others to the cause of 
prohibition. To give some context, it almost goes without saying that the US has a number of 
material capabilities at its disposal which are, or have the capacity to be, “productive and 
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destructive” potentials.148 As is commonly known, in this manner, the US has the world’s largest 
military force with defense expenditures far exceeding any other states’. To give context, while 
the US spends nearly $640 billion a year on defense spending or roughly 3.8% of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), China—the world’s second largest military power—spends only $188 
billion annually or 2.0% of their GDP.149 Alongside the US’ military prowess, to switch focus, is 
the power of their economy. Even though current discourse suggests that China is due to become 
the world’s largest economic powerhouse in the next few decades, at present, the US remains the 
world’s largest with a total GDP of an estimated $16.7 trillion.150  
 
Despite the significance of these two factors alone, however, there are also those capabilities that 
may not be currently in use, but that have the potential for development and growth. The US, in 
this instance, is a country both plentiful with natural resources and the technological know-how 
to put these resources to good use. To be more specific, not only is the country resource-rich in 
natural minerals and rare elements, it also has the largest coal reserves in the world (with 27% of 
the total share) thus providing the country with a profitable and useful form of energy.151 The 
possibility for the US to make use of these potentials for its own benefit, to put it simply, is great. 
Added to the fact that the US is undoubtedly one of the top—if not the top—knowledge 
producers (in science, medicine, technology, and the like), the country has a wealth of various 
resources at its disposal. 
                
Beyond merely providing a description of the US’ material power, though, it is necessary to put 
these facts into context and to examine their role in preserving the norm of prohibition. Perhaps 
the most interesting source to look at, in this instance, is the US State Department’s 2013 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). The INCSR itself, as it states in its 
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introduction, is a required annual report prepared for the President (and later for Congress) on the 
extent to which the major drug producing and drug transit countries are addressing the trafficking 
and smuggling on narcotics across borders.152 The report is then used, in accordance with the 
US’ Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, to determine whether or not the states in question 
are deserving of further assistance.153 
 
What is perhaps most interesting about the INCSR though, is the information provided about the 
US’ active involvement in other countries’ narcotic control programs. A detailed description of 
every country member to the UN agreements, the level of success of their current narcotic 
control programs, and the level of US involvement is detailed in the INCSR. In some instances, 
like in Azerbaijan, US involvement was rather limited; in other instances, however, the US 
provided equipment (like the 40-ft Avenger interceptor for the Bahamian maritime police or the 
donated body scanners given to Nigeria for airport scanning); training (in the form of specially 
vetted task forces in Honduras); funds (in the form of created national or regional drug control 
agencies in Ghana or for legal agencies in Guatemala); and development programs more 
generally.154 Ultimately, the vast wealth and technology that the US has at its disposal allows it 
to encourage its own ideals and interests abroad. For many of the countries receiving this US 
assistance, on the other hand, it is much needed-support that would be inane to refuse. 
 
In addition to all of this, the US—alongside other ally countries like Canada, Australia, Japan, 
the UK, and the like—remain one of the key donors to the UNODC today and have been for 
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quite some time.155 Just in its very ability to donate so much time, effort, and financial endeavour 
to the task of narcotic control demonstrates how important the US believes the issue to be. 
 
4.4.5 Conclusion: An Evaluation of Cox’s Insights 
 
As previously discussed, the norm life-cycle model does not adequately address the role that 
power plays within international norm dynamics and as such, it is ultimately limited in its 
applicability. In the case of international drug prohibition specifically, the life-cycle model was 
useful in tracing the evolution of the norm (in spite of the expected deviations addressed), but 
failed—due to its limited conceptualisation—to account for the role that US power had in 
perpetuating and sustaining the norm regardless of its failures. On the other hand, what Cox’s 
insights effectively show, as evidenced in the preceding discussion, is that hegemonic powers 
can both create and sustain norms consistent with and applicable to their own interests and 
views. The US, as the leading power of the world post-WWII, had both the capacity and means 
to establish what it believed to be the appropriate way of handling the drug issue—through the 
complete prohibition of supply. Through the US’ ideas, its vast material capabilities, and its 
influence in the UN, it was effectively able to establish the international drug control regime that 
exists today despite the myriad of issues that plague the system.      
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CHAPTER 5: 
Conclusion  
5.1 Summary of the Study 
 
While global drug prohibition may not, at first glance, seem to be a likely case of international 
norm dynamics and power relations, the present study has sought to shed light on how it can be 
understood as such. To accomplish this task, the study set out to prove three, distinct arguments: 
first, that international drug prohibition was a norm; second, that the norm itself was traceable 
over time; and third, that the norm continues to exist today because of the underlying power 
relations existent within the international system. 
 
To accomplish the first and second objectives, in this manner, a constructivist norm-life cycle 
model was applied. Through such application, it became possible to trace the development of 
prohibition over time, to establish prohibition as an international norm more generally, and to 
identify the main causal mechanisms at work in each stage of its evolution. However, as was 
demonstrated through the analysis, the norm did not develop in the exact manner the model 
suggested it would. More specifically, while the model hypothesizes institutionalisation and 
critical endorsement to happen in the emergent phase, the analysis demonstrated that, in the case 
of prohibition, these factors only arose in the norm’s final, internalization stage. On a final note, 
what also became clear at this point was the leading role played by the US in encouraging and 
endorsing the norm further in its development. In fact, as the analysis established, it was largely 
at the behest of the US that prohibition emerged and progressed on the international stage at all. 
 
Following the application of the norm life cycle model, the analysis then established the failure 
of the international drug prohibition system more generally. By thoroughly examining figures 
compiled by the WHO, the UNODC, and various other academic reports and studies, it became 
clear that the regime never achieved its desired goals at any point in its century-long existence. 
Instead, the international community has consistently failed to end all illicit (non-scientific or 
medicinal) drug production, trade and consumption. 
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Considering these failures, it would seem fitting for the international community to disregard 
prohibition as a way of managing the drug issue and to instead implement a more measured 
approach to the problem. Yet, as the analysis demonstrates, prohibition remains the international 
community’s answer to the issue largely because of the US’ (and its various allies) vehement 
efforts and insistence. To explain the importance of these power dynamics in sustaining the 
norm’s livelihood in greater detail—and thereby proving the third hypothesis of this study—the 
analysis subsequently applied a critical theory framework to the issue. By means of Robert Cox’s 
insights on power and hegemony, more specifically, the analysis demonstrated how the ideas, 
institutions, and material capabilities supporting US (and more generally Western) hegemony in 
the case of international narcotic control ultimately allowed for the regime to remain intact. In 
this way, the analysis effectively demonstrated how underlying power relations existent within 
the international system can ultimately help a norm survive long past its usefulness. 
   
5.2 Potential Change in Sight 
 
Although it may be too early to say with any certainty, there is considerable evidence to suggest 
that at least some members of the international community are again, slowly changing their 
views on drug control and prohibition. The European Union, in this manner, is (and has been for 
some time) a forerunner in this trend, increasingly turning its attention away from prohibition 
and punitive measures and turning towards more measured approaches to drug reduction and 
harm-reduction strategies.156 The establishment of safe-injection facilities in numerous European 
cities (and also within the Canadian city of Vancouver) is but one example of this increasing 
trend.157  
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Even outside of Europe though, more people have begun voicing their opposition to the 
prohibitive nature of the current international drug control system. The Latin American 
Commission on Drugs and Democracy and its successor the Global Commission on Drug Policy 
are but two examples of such groups calling for a change to current regulations. To give some 
context, the former—which consists predominantly of Latin American academics and 
politicians—gives a voice to those Andean societies and drug-producing nations that seek to alter 
the existing discourse on drugs by placing greater focus on the demand-side of the issue.158 If 
more discussions and agreements were to emphasize demand reduction and health services 
instead of penalisation and crime, the Commission claims, the policies adopted would ultimately 
be more humane.159 The Global Commission on Drug Policy, in the same vein, furthers the work 
of the Latin American initiative by involving all countries across the globe. Their specific 
purpose, as outlined in their mandate, is to “bring to the international level an informed, science-
based discussion about humane and effective ways to reduce the harm caused by drugs to people 
and societies.”160 
 
As a final example, the recent legalisation of cannabis within Uruguay and parts of the US may 
also demonstrate a relative weakening of prohibition (at least in regards to cannabis) in certain 
domestic contexts.161 If the present study is any indication of ‘norm dynamics and political 
change’, as it hopes to be, this new domestic legislation could potentially signal changes to come 
on the international level as well. What is especially interesting about these developments, in 
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particular, is its emergence in the domestic US. That such change is originating in the same place 
that prohibition itself first began is, to say the very least, an interesting turn of events. 
 
Pragmatically speaking, however, the above discussion does not and should not imply that 
current international agreements might change any time soon. Considering, in this manner, that 
the UN treaties are in effect bound to every party signatory, drastic change to the stipulations 
requires the agreement of each and every member as well as the INCB.162 In this manner, unless 
there is significant change to the UN’s entire administrative framework on drug control or a 
drastic increase in the number of states changing their own domestic legislation on narcotics, it 
will still be a long time before the current international treaties are either eradicated or adjusted 
accordingly.  
 
5.3 Further Research 
 
There is ultimately no theory that can perfectly explain the social world in all its complexities; 
instead, each theory provides a specific way of understanding and explaining the world and the 
phenomena within it. To put it simply, theories merely provide the social scientist different 
answers to the same questions. 
  
To put this in context then, there are potentially many different ways of understanding and 
examining international drug prohibition that—while out of the purview of this study 
specifically—remain fruitful avenues of inquiry (especially when used in conjunction with the 
approach taken here). Some analysts might argue for a ‘sunk costs’ approach, for instance, 
wherein so much time, effort, and financial endeavour has been put toward the goal of 
prohibition that it may seem wasted to simply dismiss such costs so readily. On the other hand, 
other scholars might opt for a different approach entirely and instead argue that since 
organisations often take on a life of their own, it becomes difficult to suddenly stop their 
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institutional ‘life’ so to speak.163 Regardless of the approach taken to explain global drug 
prohibition however, what is ultimately most important for the international community is for it 
to recognize that—on a very pragmatic level—prohibition is not working and that it will, most 
likely, never work. So long as human beings have a desire to alter their state of consciousness, 
substance use and abuse will follow; trying to control or completely eradicate these practices, in 
this manner, is simply fighting a war that cannot be won. It is only through such recognition that 
change becomes possible—a change that, hopefully, will start to help instead of harm.     
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: DRUG CONSUMPTION RATES WORLDWIDE  
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime164 
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APPENDIX B: ILLICIT TRAFFICKING ROUTES BY SUBSTANCE 
B.1 MAJOR OPIUM AND HEROIN TRAFFICKING ROUTES 
 
Source: CIA Factbook 165 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
165 Central Intelligence Agency, 2000. Available online: https://www.princeton.edu/~ina/drugs/sources.html 
(Accessed December 24th 2014). 
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B.2: MAJOR AMPHETAMINE TRAFFICKING ROUTES 
 
 
Source: UNODC166 
 
 
                                               
 
166 “World Drug Report 2010.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available online: 
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B.3: MAJOR CANNABIS TRAFFICKING ROUTES 
 
 
Source: European Parliament167 
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 “The Fight Against Drugs.” European Parliament. Available online: 
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APPENDIX C: A TIMELINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM 
168 
 
1907: Ten Year Agreement: 
▪ Britain, China and India agree trilateral framework for ending Indian opium exports to China 
within ten years. 
▪ Agreement becomes model for future supply control system. 
 
1909: Shanghai Opium Commission 
▪ Initiated under American leadership. 
▪ First truly international drug control meeting. 
▪ The Great Powers examine ways to suppress international opium traffic – particularly traffic 
bound for China. 
▪ Largely ends in discord but leads to 1912 Opium Convention. 
 
 
1912: Opium Convention 
▪ Beginning of international drug control system. 
▪ States encouraged to end drug abuse. Remains vague on mechanisms to achieve this. 
▪ Signatories must prevent shipment of opium to states which bar its entry. 
▪ Entered into force in 1919. 
▪ Co-opted into new League of Nations. 
▪ United States’ leadership undermined by its ambiguous relationship with League administered 
system. 
 
 
1925: Geneva Opium Conventions 
▪ Establish first mechanisms to enforce supply control framework. 
▪ Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) created to monitor international imports and exports 
of narcotics. 
                                               
 
168
 London School of Economics, Governing the Global Drug Wars, 9-11. This timeline is taken directly from the 
London School of Economics guide. 
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▪ United States fails to secure end to all ‘non-medical and scientific’ drug use. Walks out of 
proceedings and never signs. 
▪ Treaty gains widespread adherence over time. 
1931: Conventions 
▪ United States cooperates with UK, Germany, and other industrialised states to fashion a 
workable control scheme. 
▪ First introduction of schedules into international treaties. 
▪ Creation of system of estimates. Administered by Drug Supervisory Body (DSB). 
▪ Formalises international distinction between licit and illicit drug trades. 
▪ Both PCOB and DSB function as quasi-judicial bodies independent of League of Nations. 
 
1936: Convention 
▪ Aimed at suppressing growing illicit traffic. 
▪ United States again fails to successfully advocate for end to all ‘non-medical and scientific’ 
drug use. Its delegates withdraw active cooperation for remainder of treaty negotiations. 
▪ Eventually ratified only by Canada and a few other minor states. Never comes into force. 
 
1939-40: States consider negotiating international supply control agreement. 
Interrupted by WWII. 
1939-1945: WWII 
▪ Certain PCOB, DSB and League functions transfer from Geneva to Washington. Continue to 
function (minimally) throughout war. 
▪ United States extracts commitments from Britain and the Netherlands to end opium monopolies 
in the Far East. Exceptions remain. French follow suit in 1945. 
 
 
1945-6: United Nations becomes new custodian for administration of existing 
treaties. 
▪ Continuity with pre-war system maintained. 
 
1948: Convention 
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▪ Brings synthetic narcotics under international control. 
 
1953: Opium Protocol 
▪ Prescribes more severe limitation of agricultural production of opiates. 
▪ Forced through by the US, France and other allies. 
▪ Rejected by agricultural producing countries and had little hope for gaining widespread 
acceptance. 
 
1961: Single Convention 
▪ Unifies previous Conventions (except 1936) into one document. 
▪ United States works to thwart its ratification, and instead bring 1953 Protocol into force. 
 
1964: Single Convention enters into force. US initially refuses to ratify. 
▪ PCOB and DSB are merged into International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Retains a 
‘quasi-judicial’ role. 
 
1967: US ratifies Single Convention. 
 
1971: Convention 
▪ Brings Psychotropic (psychoactive) substances under international control, but in a less 
stringent form than applied to opioids, coca and cannabis. 
 
1972: Protocol Amending the Single Convention 
▪ Product of US efforts to strengthen Single Convention and INCB. 
▪ Six decades after first Opium Convention, international system remains overwhelmingly 
focused on supply control issues. 
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1972: UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) created. 
▪ Nominally independent but reliant on US patronage. 
▪ Heavily supply control focused. 
 
1988: Convention 
▪ Primarily aimed at tackling organised crime and trafficking. 
▪ Addresses demand issues by recommending criminalisation of personal consumption. 
 
 
1998: United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
▪ Commits states to massive reductions in drug use and supply within ten years. 
▪ Slogan: ‘A drug free world. We can do it!’ 
 
 
2009: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon claims criminalisation of injecting drug 
use is hampering HIV/AIDS fight. Calls for decriminalisation. 
 
